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Introduction 
Beginning of the 21
st
 century was the time when some major changes in the world’s 
economy took place. Developing countries started their impressive rise to world leadership, 
while gaining economic power and international influence. This process has been fuelled by 
different factors in Russia and China, that both belong to the largest developing economies in the 
world. In Russia, the progress was largely driven by its national oil companies, following the rise 
in oil prices. In China, foreign investment and manufacturing helped to boost the economy. 
However, these two countries share a lot of very important characteristics and trends.  
First of all, both Russia and China share a socialist past and have a strong state, i.e. their 
governments exercise a very high degree of influence over many areas of the economy and own 
a lot of different enterprises within the so-called pillar industries. Second, both countries have 
established special umbrella organizations that united largest state-owned companies in various 
strategic industries to manage them more effectively. Also, a series of market reforms has been 
conducted to change the old-fashioned non-efficient state-owned enterprise (SOE) model and 
allow the companies be driven by market forces. One of the organizations established to boost 
the profitability of SOEs was China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council (SASAC). It was created in 2003 and originally managed over 
200 large holding companies and about 150,000 small enterprises. By 2013, the number of 
SASAC-controlled entities shrank to 117, partly due to sell-off and partly because some large-
scale mergers took place. The list of the companies is not finalized yet and is expected to drop 
under 100 in the coming years. However, the largest portion of revenue, profit and assets is 
generated by only a handful of companies, among which national oil companies (NOCs) 
play the most prominent role. There are only two major NOCs in China, and the industry is 
very centralized. They are also the most actively internationalizing Chinese companies, just as 
their peers in Russia. 
Today, oil accounts for almost 50% of energy consumed worldwide and it is the main 
source of revenue for many countries across all continents. Generally, oil companies can be 
divided into two categories: those owned by national governments (NOCs), and those owned by 
private investors (international-owned companies, IOCs, such as Shell, ConocoPhillips, etc.). 
National-owned companies posses 90% of world’s oil & gas reserves and account for 75% 
of production. Private international oil companies have 10% of worldwide reserves, but account 
for 25% of total output. 
The role of NOCs has been growing over the last two decades. The composition of 
worldwide oil reserves ownership has been changing accordingly. Some of the largest NOCs by 
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oil reserves, output and revenue are Chinese companies owned by the government. One of them 
is China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec Group) with its publicly traded subsidiary 
China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation Limited (Sinopec Limited). Sinopec Limited is 
the largest oil company in China by revenue ($440 billion in 2014) and one of the most active 
players in the fields of international alliances and M&A (Sinopec Annual Report 2014). While 
mostly owned by the government, it pursues a market-driven strategy trying to increase margins, 
secure higher profits and diversify risks. However, state support remains an invaluable resource 
for the company to attain its goals and grow further. The company has historically focused on the 
downstream sector of oil production and started to actively internationalize earlier than other 
major Chinese NOCs. In the mid-2000s the company had a greater need to go overseas in order 
to level its downstream operations with inputs, i.e. to have more crude oil to process. Although 
the company operates on its own, one should be able to see the State behind it and understand 
that Sinopec is a member of a large, SASAC-managed family, with other major NOCs belonging 
to it as well.  
The other major oil company in China is China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 
with $425 billion revenue in 2014 and its traded arm PetroChina. Sinopec, being the largest NOC 
out of two in terms of revenue, and the most actively internationalizing one, is the most 
representative company to study. Its operations and strategy is similar to and aligned with that of 
CNPC, and by focusing on Sinopec, we will be able to make generalizations for the whole 
industry. 
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Chapter I. Literature review 
1.1 Literature review 
Theoretical materials related to our topic can be split into three groups: 1) general studies 
on internationalization and internationalization of firms from emerging market economies 2) 
studies on state capitalism and the specific features of the Chinese internationalization strategy 3) 
studies on internationalization of Chinese NOCs. Since the developing capitalist economies with 
strong state have become the talk of the town only in the 21
st
 century, and the science of 
management faced the rapidly internationalizing NOCs only recently, the volume of relevant 
literature is rather limited, but the importance of the phenomenon suggests that a certain amount 
of studies has been conducted. 
1.1.1 Studies on the theory of internationalization 
Internationalization can be defined in many ways, as increased international involvement 
and the associated changes in organizational forms (Bilkey, Tesar 1977) or simply as outward 
movement in a firm's international operations (Turnbull 1987). But whatever the definition, the 
essence remains the same. When a company expands its operations into other countries 
increasing its global presence it internationalizes.  
Adam Smith was one of the first economists to discuss internationalization stating that it 
results from the absolute cost advantage of one entity over the other. He claimed that a larger 
number of the same goods or services can be produced with a different amount of labor. The 
party that uses less labor has the absolute cost advantage and therefore can export at a 
competitive price (Smith 1776). 
David Ricardo thought that Smith’s concept was incomplete and didn’t account for the 
opportunity costs. In Ricardo’s view expressed in ‘Principles of Political Economy and Taxation’, 
under free trade, an agent will produce more of and consume less of a good for which he has a 
comparative advantage. This way, the concept of comparative advantage was developed and 
later became regarded as one of the main drivers for international trade.  
Although Ricardo’s theory explained the case of international trade it didn’t address in a 
comprehensive manner the reasons behind differences in transactions volume between different 
agents. This gap was filled by the Gravity Model of Trade used by Jan Tinbergen in his work 
‘Shaping the world economy; suggestions for an international economic policy’. The model 
predicts trade flows between two agents based on the economic size and distance between them. 
Another important theory that many later works were based on is the transaction cost 
theory. Developed by Ronald Coase, it claims that internal costs of operations can be lower than 
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external ones due to a number of reasons (level of control, risks, opportunistic behavior of 
suppliers, unpredictable market conditions, high interest rates etc.). This encourages firms to 
integrate and internationalize (Coase 1937). 
Later, more theories of international trade and internationalization were developed. The 
most important ones are the Location theory, Heckscher-Ohlin model, behavioral theory of the 
firm, Uppsala model and bargaining power theory. Location theory says that the main reason for 
internationalization is maximization of profits due to choosing more favorable locations. The 
Heckscher-Ohlin model can predict trade flows and production in particular regions. It was 
created by Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin when they expanded Ricardo’s comparative advantage 
model and gave it a more scientific and mathematical outlook. Behavioral theory of the firm in 
turn referred to the physiological side of the issue arguing that a firm consists of groups 
(management, workers, suppliers etc.) who all influence decision-making which is based on a 
negotiated compromise. The Uppsala model explains the process of internationalization: first a 
company gains expertise in its domestic market then starts exporting to neighboring countries, 
later switches to more distant importers, and eventually establishes subsidiaries. Bargaining 
power theory assumes that there is correlation between bargaining power of a firm and its host 
country, i.e. companies prefer strategies with high control and, ceteris paribus, choose countries 
with lower bargaining power.  
It is also very important to mention Porter’s diamond model first presented in ‘The 
competitive advantage of nations’, and its later version the so-called double-diamond model 
(Rugman 1993). Porter’s model generalizes factors that influence the competitive advantage of a 
firm. The factors are: 1) factor conditions (human and knowledge resources, infrastructure etc.), 
2) firm strategy, structure and rivalry (rivalry challenges the company forcing it to improve and 
innovate), 3) demand conditions (a big and developed market pressures companies to innovate 
and be proactive), 4) related and supporting industries (the existence and level of development of 
industries that produce products and services important for innovation and internationalization), 
5) government (obviously, it can influence everything) and 6) chance (uncontrollable events that 
can interrupt the normal structure and thus create, enhance or decrease the competitive advantage 
of a company). However, Porter’s model didn’t take into account the importance of international 
activities. Double-diamond model was created to fix this problem. It consists of two diamonds, 
one for home country, the other for host country.  Complementary to it is another Porter’s model 
referred to as Value Chain. It divides firm’s activities into two main segments, namely support 
activities (e.g. HR, finance, etc.) and primary activities (in case of NOCs that would be 
exploration, refining, marketing, etc.). This framework would be especially useful for us to see 
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the benefits brought along by the special relationship existing between Sinopec Group, which is 
100% state-owned, and Sinopec Limited, which is partially freely traded on stock exchange. 
The last theory is of the utmost importance for us. It is the so-called eclectic paradigm or 
the OLI-Model developed by John H. Dunning in his work ‘Trade, location of economic activity 
and the MNE: A search for an eclectic approach’. It takes into consideration the advantages of a 
firm in relation to its ownership, location and possible international expansion, and helps to 
determine the best internationalization option. One important advantage of this model is that it 
incorporates a variety of other frameworks and gives a good understanding of a company’s 
competitive position and potential as well as particular recommendations on its strategy. 
Igor Ansoff (Ansoff 1970) has made the next step in internationalization theory and 
focused on particular activities that a firm could focus on as an outcome of internal and external 
factors. Although his framework is devoted to growth in general, it reflects the available 
internationalization options very well. He developed four main options, that are market 
penetration, market development, product development, and diversification. We will see that 
Chinese NOCs tend to use employ all four options. 
Researches on the general theory of internationalization are quite abundant, but studies on 
the more recent phenomenon, that is internationalization of firms from emerging market 
economies, are more limited. The rise of Japan and the Four Asian Tigers, that started in the 
1950-60s, triggered the first wave of such studies (e.g., Lecraw, 1977, 1983; Wells 1983; Lall 
1984), but the recent dramatic shift from socialism to capitalism in the 1980s and the rapid 
expansion of Russian and Chinese firms in the 2000s made the matter even more urgent. 
It has been widely accepted that firms from emerging market economies are forced to 
quickly internationalize through brownfield investment, because their long-established rivals 
have secured the most lucrative assets  (Ning 2009; Fan et al. 2008; Deng 2007; Buckley et al. 
2007; Cai 1999). The so-called ‘springboard perspective’ suggests that such firms acquire 
strategic assets from the more mature companies ‘to facilitate their propulsion to the world 
scene’. Seven reasons that motivate firms to apply the ‘springboard move’ are: 1) to compensate 
for their weaknesses, such as lack of experience, technology and strong brand; 2) to 
overcome their latecomer disadvantage; 3) to attack global rivals’ foothold in their own 
home markets; 4) to bypass trade barriers; 5) to alleviate domestic institutional constraints; 
6) to get preferential treatment offered by other/ their own emerging market government; 
7) to exploit their competitive advantages in other emerging market economies (Luo, Tung 
2007). Another aspect of internationalization, that has also been paid attention to, is the strategy 
and its formation. Most studies on this topic (Luo, Rui 2009; Tsai, Eisengerich 2010; Child, 
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Rodriguez 2005; Fortanier, Van Tulder 2009; Cuervo-Cazurra, Genc 2008). Irina Mihailova & 
Andrei Panibratov (2012) take the next step and develop a framework that enables researchers to 
analyze the strategy of EMFs (emerging-market firms). According to it, the strategy should be 
assessed along three dimensions: macroeconomic level, industry level and firm level, with 
special attention paid to the government influence and firm-specific resources and capabilities. 
All dimensions are interconnected and should be assessed together. 
All these theories complement each other and help to understand the reasons behind 
internationalization in general, and specific for the state-owned firms from the emerging market 
economies in particular. 
 
1.1.2 Studies on state capitalism and the specific features of Chinese 
internationalization strategy  
The second group of studies is dedicated to the issue of state capitalism and the related 
specific features of Chinese companies’ internationalization strategy. One needs to have a good 
understanding of China’s economy and politics, due to the intricate relationship between 
the government and large businesses. This relationship has a profound impact on companies’ 
strategies, and is one of the most important factors defining their internationalization activity. 
Very illustrative indeed is the fact that in majority of cases general managers of large enterprises 
are also senior members of the Communist Party of China, and are therefore accountable to both 
the various stockholders and the ruling party. When China started to reform its economy, the first 
decade of the going-out policy (走出去  zouchuqu in Chinese) was shaped by political 
considerations, rather than profit-maximization. State-owned companies were the only ones 
allowed to invest abroad, and any foreign activity had to be checked and approved by the 
Government. However, this regulation was gradually relaxed. In the mid-1980s, when Chinese 
companies were allowed to operate abroad upon presenting the proof of possessing sufficient 
capital, technical know-how, and suitable foreign partners (Tan 1998). Further deregulation took 
place in the 2000s, when China joined the World Trade Organization, and Chinese firms were 
encouraged to go abroad and invest. The approval ceilings were raised (that is companies had to 
apply for state approval only if their activity would involve extremely large amounts of money). 
Chinese businesses, having accumulated cash from export, immediately followed the global 
trend and started to internationalize, however, the companies from pillar industries, including 
Sinopec and other NOCs, have remained under tight control of the State (Hong, Sun 2006). 
13 
 
Ian Bremmer’s (2009) article ‘State Capitalism Comes of Age: The End of the Free 
Market’, highlights the fact that what the world is experiencing now is the 4th wave of state 
capitalism. The author claims that nowadays all major powers tend to tighten control over their 
economies, even the US. However, he believes that this trend’s ‘future will likely prove limited, 
particularly if it cannot provide even its two leading practitioners with a working model for 
sustainable growth’ (p.54). ‘The two leading practitioners’ are Russia and China, for both of 
which a number of examples is given. In the end, the author concludes, that ‘free market remains 
the most powerful and the most durable alternative to state capitalism’. According to the article, 
the primary actors in state capitalism are national oil corporations, state-owned enterprises, 
privately owned national champions and sovereign wealth funds. All these actors form a 
complicated net of joint businesses and related obligations, orchestrated by the government. We 
will observe this situation happening in Chinese oil industry with the close ties between NOCs, 
state-owned banks and the government. 
The authors of ‘Governments as owners: State-owned multinational companies’ (Cuervo-
Cazurra et al. 2014) take a new approach toward SOEs saying that, ‘the time is ripe to revise this 
classical view because in many of the market economies, SOEs have undergone enormous 
change spurred mostly by the pro-market reforms that swept through Europe, Latin America and 
Asia. Although SOEs have existed for a long time, these changes have heralded the rise of a new 
breed of SOEs that have shed some of the shortcomings of their predecessors as they focus more 
intently on the global arena’. This view indicates a new approach to state-owned enterprises in 
general and NOCs in particular. The companies are regarded not as doomed dinosaurs, but as a 
new and possibly revolutionary model that combines the best of the two worlds blending it into 
the state capitalism phenomenon. It also stresses the fact that state-owned enterprises are 
stepping into international business without fear and are ready to compete with the long-
established champions, exploiting the benefits that are brought along with the close ties with the 
government and its financing capabilities. 
Although state capitalism has become a usual occurrence, each country practices it in a 
different way. The practice of internationalization with regards to the specific features of the 
Chinese state and business has been studied by Libor and Korniyenko (2008) in their work titled 
‘China’s Investments in Russia: Where do they go and how important are they?’ They argue that 
Chinese SOEs OFDI is motivated by three factors: acquiring advanced technology through 
M&As, increasing market share, and natural resource endowment. From the perspective of the 
Chinese government, natural resources are the primary motivator, have been responsible for 81% 
of loans issued for OFDI since 2002. As a growing energy consumer second only to the United 
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States, the country is currently dependent on oil imports — a dependence they would like to 
mitigate by securing their own sources. Market share gain is the second largest incentive, 
representing 15% of state-financed foreign projects.  This type of project is dominated by 
Chinese power companies.  OFDI for technology acquisition purposes accounts for only 4% of 
total OFDI, but this still represents a departure from how other ‘Asian Miracle’ countries 
operated.  China still has a sizeable surplus of foreign currencies in an economically depressed 
global environment, making cheap acquisitions of Western enterprises an enticing option. One 
disadvantage of this approach is prompting anti-Chinese sentiment in the host countries. The U.S. 
Congress, for example, citing ‘national security threats,’ has blocked multiple Chinese attempts 
to purchase American oil companies.  To the chagrin of many global players, these focuses 
indicate that China is not using OFDI for ‘industrial adjustment,’ or ‘efficiency-seeking.’ This 
article sheds light on the mechanics of Chinese NOCs’ M&A deals and what obstacles they face. 
Another important study on the specific features of Chinese companies’ 
internationalization is Randell Morck’s ‘Perspectives on China’s Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment.’ It states that Chinese OFDI shows preference for countries with weak institutions. 
Research indicates that ‘past experience in certain institutional environments significantly 
predicts survival when a firm invests in another such environment’. While companies from the 
developed world find it difficult to operate in markets with excessive bureaucracy, corruption, 
low transparency, and political constraints, Chinese TNCs already have experience with such 
institutional features. 
 
1.1.3 Studies on internationalization of Chinese NOCs 
Literature on internationalization of Chinese national oil companies is not extensive, and 
primarily exists in the form of information papers and reports. They tend to focus on the 
motivation for internationalization and/or the role of the government. Since Chinese companies 
started to engage in internationalization activities about a decade ago, scholars have not yet 
developed a consistent and inclusive model for the new phenomenon. However, a number of 
studies have been conducted in order to fill the gap. Some of the most important sources of data 
and studies are presented below. 
International Energy Agency (IEA) keeps track of all major shifts and changes happening 
in the oil and gas industry worldwide. It accumulates related statistics and is an invaluable source 
of data. The Agency publishes reports on Chinese oil companies every year and is an excellent 
tool to observe the long-term trends. According to one of the latest reports (IEA 2014), Chinese 
energy sector outward investment has grown dramatically in the past 8 years following the 
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financial crisis in 2008, making Chinese NOCs some of the largest oil producers in the world 
accounting for about 7% of total output. IEA reports also study NOCs’ relationship with the 
government. For example, all NOCs foreign projects must be approved by the Chinese 
Commission of Commerce, and larger projects (exceeding $300) require further approval of the 
State Council. However, NOCs have recently gone public with a significant amount of shares 
circulating in the market. This reflects the intricate and important relationship between the 
government, internationalization, profits and reforms. 
Two most prominent and comprehensive publications on China’s energy sector and the 
NOCs are ‘The Strategic Implications of China’s Energy Needs’ (2002) and ‘China, Oil and 
Global Politics’ (2011) by Philip Andrews-Speed and Roland Dannreuthner. The first book gives 
a detailed description of China’s energy policy, while the second publication is more business-
focused and offers some valuable insights into the relationship between the NOCs and the State. 
Other researchers take a descriptive approach and give an overview of the NOCs international 
activity (Thomson, Boey 2015; Alon et al. 2015) or the misperceptions related to it (Alon et al. 
2015).  
Researchers have also paid attention to the motivation of Chinese NOCs to go abroad. 
Some of them argue that acquisition of strategic assets is the main motivation, especially for the 
downstream companies such as Sinopec (Lai 2014). However, they omit the fact that China’s 
NOCs are seeking diversification and downstream companies are growing increasingly active in 
the upstream sector which requires more natural resources. Others stick to the traditional set of 
OLI framework’s ‘market, resources, efficiency, strategic asset/capability’ types of motivation 
(Xu 2011). Altogether, most researchers tend to agree on the list of motivations for the Chinese 
NOCs to spread their activities abroad. However, not enough attention has been paid to the 
specific way they do it. This could be caused by the time lag, since active internationalization 
and expansion has started after 2008, when Chinese NOCs emerged as one of the players who 
had cash and desire to spend it. 
Chih-shian Liou (2009) in ‘Bureaucratic Politics and Overseas Investment by Chinese 
State-Owned Oil Companies: Illusory Champions’ looks at the obstacles that Chinese NOCs face 
due to the complex nature of oil business and its ties to the so-called oil diplomacy. It takes the 
NOCs a lot of skill and effort to successfully navigate between the short-term and long-term 
interests as well as government directions and monetary considerations.  
Researchers have also been exploring the role of various internal and external factors in 
determining NOCs’ internationalization strategy. ‘China's Global Equity Oil Investments: 
Economic and Geopolitical Influences’ by Wojtek M. Wolfe and Brock F. Tessman (2012) 
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explores various external political, economic and institutional factors that shape Chinese NOCs 
foreign investment policy. They analyze oil-rich countries one-by-one assessing each along a list 
of parameters that help to determine whether they are of interest to the Chinese NOCs and to 
what extent. Another view on the same issue is presented in Chen Shaofengs’s article 
‘Motivations behind China’s Foreign Oil Quest: A Perspective from the Chinese Government 
and the Oil Companies’. The author looks at the internal factor of cooperation between the 
government and the NOCs, discovering the underlying motives and reasons for particular moves 
in China’s energy policy and consequently NOCs international strategy. Mr. Chen stresses the 
benefits that such co-operation brings and generally speaks in favor of it. 
1.1.4 Summary and research gap 
The general process of internationalization has been studied quite well, however, 
internationalization of state-owned companies from strong-state countries is a relatively new 
phenomenon. Chinese NOCs are some of the most actively internationalizing state-owned 
companies in the world and present an extremely interesting object of study, due to the scale and 
scope of their operations, complicated relationship with the government, and struggle to secure 
both profits and diplomatic victories. 
Researchers have studied relationship between the NOCs and the government, generally 
coming to the conclusion that the government owns, but does not run the companies. Motivation 
behind NOCs’ international activity has been studied quite well, but most works fall within the 
existing frameworks limited to identifying motivations. At the same time, they tend to be 
outdated and focus on activity in the downstream sector without paying enough attention to the 
upstream sector of the oil industry. The ‘market-, resource-, efficiency-, strategic 
asset/capability-’ seeking motivation framework proves its validity and is widely applied to the 
Chinese NOCs (Dunning 1998; Dunning, Lundan 2008). On the other hand, these four types of 
motivations cannot fully reflect the strategy, since they do not include the incentives given by the 
internationalizing firms to their partners and potential objects of M&A.. Thus, it can be stated 
that no attempts have yet been made to interconnect the motivations, incentives, 
relationship with the government, and data on particular cases of alliances, JVs and M&As, 
to generalize and describe the patterns in internationalization strategy of Chinese NOCs. 
This makes the studies incomplete and inapplicable to real-life situations, when strategic 
managerial decisions must be based on a combination of factors.  
To fill in the research gap up, an attempt will be made to answer the following question: 
What are the internationalization strategies of Chinese NOCs, 
and what factors determine them? 
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1.2 Research question and objectives 
The goal of this study is to identify and generalize the experience of planning and 
implementation of internationalization strategies among Chinese national oil companies to 
improve the internationalization strategies for the industry in general and Russian national oil 
companies in particular. To attain this aim we will pick the largest Chinese oil company Sinopec 
Limited and its parent company Sinopec Group, which could be representative of the industry. 
The questions that will be answered are as follows: 
1) What are the internationalization strategies of Chinese NOCs? 
2) What factors determine these strategies? 
 
There are several reasons that contribute to the importance of study on the 
internationalization strategy of Chinese NOCs. First of all, the size of these companies and the 
scope of their operations produce a profound impact on the industry and the world economy. 
Their increasing internationalization efforts have multiple directions and presently can be 
observed on all continents. 
Second, there exists a number of misconceptions about Chinese NOCs caused by their 
unique features. General studies on the internationalization of emerging-market firms are unable 
to address the complex nature of Chinese NOCs and their international activity. 
Finally, Chinese NOCs started playing a prominent active role in international business a 
decade ago, and the related managerial studies are incomplete due to the time lag. The 
importance of the phenomenon suggests that more up-to-date studies should be conducted. 
The research questions are aimed at fulfilling a few objectives. The first question implies 
generalization and categorization of internationalization strategies, as well as preceding analysis 
of particular cases and tools of internationalization. The second question requires defining the 
factors that shape the strategies and the resulting causal relationship. 
Several objectives have been identified in order to answer the abovementioned questions: 
 
1. Draw up a representative case list illustrating attempts of Chinese national oil 
companies (NOCs) to internationalize 
2. Use the multiple case analysis to develop the internationalization theory:  
2.1 to structure the  internationalization strategy 
2.2 to develop an algorithm of its formulation 
3.   Identify the internationalization strategies of Chinese NOCs 
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4.   Create a framework to develop internationalization strategy for national oil 
companies on the basis of Sinopec Group and Sinopec Limited multiple case study 
5.   Identify the internationalization activities of Chinese NOCs that could be adopted 
by Russian companies 
 
1.2.1 Research strategy and the structure of the study 
This paper is structured with the use of abductive approach with a literature review in the 
beginning and an extensive multiple case study following it. Hypothesis is not formulated until 
the analysis of the cases has been carried out. This allows us to refer to the theory presented in 
the literature review, and explore the multiple cases in an unbiased and thorough manner. 
To conduct our study, we have chosen the qualitative explanatory multiple case study 
methodology. This is the only methodology that would allow us to study NOCs strategies in 
their contexts and complexity, going deep into each case and extracting its essence (Yin 2006, 
Stake 2013). We believe that a national oil companies’ strategy is driven not just by financial 
indexes and reports, but also by global political and social environment. The method also 
enabled us to deconstruct and analyze the essence of each case, and eventually generalize the 
internationalization strategy (Hancock and Algozzine 2006).  
To make the research as complete as possible, multiple cases were used to reflect all 
possible ways of internationalization. Cases of strategic alliances, JVs and M&A deals are 
presented in the third chapter of this study. The findings will be tested against data on CNPC, 
second largest NOC in China, to verify the results. 
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1.3 Summary of Chapter I 
Active internationalization of Chinese national oil companies is a recent phenomenon 
with great implications for the industry and the world economy in general. Having become the 
largest net oil importer, China is becoming one of the largest oil producers, and this is to a large 
extent done through the internationalization activity of its NOCs. 
The process of internationalization has been studied thoroughly. However the recent 
trend of actively internationalizing state-owned companies with governmental backing deserves 
special treatment, due to its scale, scope, and unusual traits. Chinese NOCs, being some of the 
largest state-owned companies in the world, present a particularly interesting case. Their 
motivation to go abroad is generally well-understood and has been well-studied. But apart from 
the motives, there is also execution and results. Combining the three, one can see the complete 
picture and generalize the strategy of Chinese NOCs.  
The unique structure of China’s oil industry has facilitated the research. Out of three 
largest oil companies run by the same commission within the Communist party of China, one is 
too small and the other two are very similar. This allowed us to narrow the research to Sinopec 
Limited, the company that has the largest revenues and is the most actively internationalizing 
NOC, and its parent company Sinopec Group controlled solely and directly by the state. Based 
on the analysis of multiple cases describing the international alliances, JVs and M&A deals of 
Sinopec Limited and Sinopec Group, we will be able to categorize and generalize the 
internationalization strategy of Chinese NOCs. 
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Chapter II. Methodology and theoretical study of Chinese NOCs’ 
internationalization strategy 
 
2.1 Determining the object of the study 
China has vast oil and gas reserves. At some point back in the 1980s the PRC exported 
oil to Japan, but then domestic demand started to grow at a much faster pace than production. 
Finally in the early 1990s China became a net oil importer and remains in this position until 
today. Although China is world’s 4th largest oil producer, most of its oilfields have reached their 
peak and the efficiency is gradually declining. 
In spite of the recent economic slowdown, China’s expected growth rate for the next few 
years is still impressive. At 6% growth per annum demand for oil and gas will continue to rise, 
and as domestic traditional oil production is starting to shrink, three options are available. Oil 
companies can increase production of nonconventional hydrocarbons (the most promising one 
being resources trapped in shale), increase imports from other countries and thus expose 
themselves to various risks, or shift toward alternative sources of energy. The last option doesn’t 
seem feasible in the short- and medium-term due to the extremely high switching costs, high 
investment and relatively low efficiency when compared to the conventional sources of energy. 
We can therefore consider the first two options.  
The key global players in oil industry are NOCs and a number of big private, publicly 
traded international oil companies (IOCs) called ‘supermajors’. Chinese NOCs have been 
cooperating with these companies for decades, both domestically and internationally. This 
collaboration has intensified in the late 1990s and early 2000s, reaching unprecedented levels in 
late 2000s due to China’s economic progress, market reforms, growing concerns about energy 
security and large currency reserves. Besides, in the last decades many companies have reached 
the point when it is often too expensive or too risky to explore and extract oil on their own, so 
they started to form alliances that sometimes resulted in mergers and acquisitions. 
Today’s oil & gas industry in China is dominated by three major companies, namely 
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and its traded arm PetroChina, Sinopec Group 
and its traded arm Sinopec Limited, and China National Offshore Corporation (CNOOC). The 
first two are similar in organizational structure, size and position, and operate in both 
upstream (exploration and production) and downstream (refining, marketing and 
distribution) sectors, while the last one focuses on upstream activity is significantly smaller 
in size and revenue.  Sinopec Limited is the largest oil company in China by revenue ($440 
billion in 2014), while its parent company Sinopec Group is one of the most active players in the 
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fields of international alliances and M&A (Sinopec Annual Report 2014). Sinopec Group and 
Sinopec Limited have historically focused on the downstream sector of oil production and started 
to actively internationalize earlier than other major Chinese NOCs. In the mid-2000’ the 
company had a greater need to go overseas in order to level its downstream operations with 
inputs, that is to have more crude oil to process. Sinopec Group and its traded subsidiary Sinopec 
Limited, which is the largest NOC in terms of revenue, are internationalizing the most actively 
among the three and thus are the most representative companies to study. Its operations and 
strategy are similar to and aligned with those of CNPC and CNOOC, and by focusing on Sinopec 
Group and Sinopec Limited, we will be able to make generalizations for the whole industry. 
A total of over 100 major deals with foreign governments and companies have been 
signed by Chinese NOCs from 2002 to 2015 (International Energy Agency 2012, 2015). Sinopec 
Group and/or Sinopec Limited have participated in over 30% of these deals, the rest spread 
between CNCPC/PetroChina, CNOOC and other less significant companies. Out of 100 deals, 
about 10 can be referred to as mega deals (worth about or over $5 billion); Sinopec took part in 5. 
The scale and scope of activity of Sinopec Group and Sinopec Limited, as well as their 
background almost identical to that of CNPC and PetroChina, allow us to narrow down the 
research on the internationalization strategies of Chinese NOCs to these two companies. 
The cases represent all regions where the Chinese NOCs are most active, and have a 
highly representative nature due to the scale of investment involved. Out of 100 major deals, 
about 30% were related to the Middle East (3 cases out of 8 contain information on operations in 
this region); 25% of deals were made in South America (3 cases involve companies from South 
America); 15% were made in Africa (1 case); 10% in North America (1 case); 5% in Russia (1 
case); the rest spread across China and its nearest neighbors (2 cases). 
 We shall look into major alliances, JVs, and M&A deals of Sinopec Group and 
Sinopec Limited, and threat them as separate cases. As a result, we shall have a detailed list 
of their internationalization efforts in the last decade, categorize them and draw 
conclusions on the company’s strategy. Generalization of the strategy as well as 
implications for the whole industry will follow. 
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2.2 Multiple-case study methodology justification 
Uniqueness of Chinese NOCs is rooted in their size, behavior, and relationship with the 
government. The vast number of factors that influence their internationalization activity makes 
the study of their strategy quite a challenging task. The importance of context and in-depth study 
of various factors and conditions have determined the methodology of this research. 
The research method employed throughout the thesis belongs to the qualitative type, 
which allows the cases to ‘unfold naturally’ (Patton 2001). The results produced with this 
method ‘cannot be obtained by means of quantification’ (Strauss, Corbin 1990). One of the ways 
to study a phenomenon is to observe it in a number of separate events, and then record the 
process and outcomes. These are the characteristics of a multiple case study, when different 
‘stories’ are recorded and compared to one another.  However, observation and recording of 
outcomes is not yet a research, since a research must include analysis and conclusions, an 
explanatory part. This part implies a constructivist approach that is based on individual 
understanding as well as on the facts from the cases. However, it does not exclude objectivity, 
since the method makes use of pluralism and the broad variety of sources, which is unattainable 
with other methods (Miller, Crabtree 1999). Ultimately, the qualitative method used ‘is great for 
understanding the world from the perspective of those studied; and for examining and 
interpreting the processes’ (Pratt 2009). 
Still, a question arises: how to reach objectivity and extract facts that a weighted and 
logical analysis could be based on? Main challenges, that a qualitative multiple-case research 
faces, are the validity and the value of its results. The value lies within the analytical 
generalizations that it can bring along (Yin 1994). Although we cannot extrapolate the results to 
other cases, we can generalize the trends by observing a large number of cases. The validity of 
research depends on the framework used to show the connection between the variables and 
outcomes (Eisenhardt 2007; Yin 1994) as well as give a ‘thick’ description of the case. The latter 
can be achieved by addressing various sources documenting details and verifying them against 
each other. Creating a good framework is a more challenging task.  
We have come up with a list of parameters to assess the cases and pull out the necessary 
uniform data. The parameters making up the framework are essentially the variables that change 
in separate cases. The distinguishing feature of these variables is that they are clear, accessible, 
different in different cases, compatible and comparable to each other. The list of parameters we 
have chosen is as follows: 
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1) Location (where the internationalization activity is taking place) 
This parameter provides us with an understanding of geographical distribution of the 
internationalization activity. Linked with the type of activity, its scale and scope, and other 
variables, it is one of the most important parameters to generalize the strategy. 
 
2) Date (when the activity started and/or ceased) 
Formation date adds the temporal dimension to our study, helping to track the changes in 
internationalization strategy. 
 
3) Goal of activity (what was the announced goal of activity) 
The announced goal of activity provides us with an understanding of the reasons standing 
behind it. Discrepancies between the announced goal and the actual outcomes can provide 
further information on the actual goals and objectives. 
 
4) Key activities (what the company and its partners were supposed to do and 
actually did/are doing under the agreement) 
This parameter allows us to look into the essence of each activity and draw parallels 
between separate cases. 
 
5) Ownership structure (who controls what) 
Ownership structure reflects the position of the company within an alliance and may 
reveal its attitude toward potential risks. 
 
6) Benefits (how did the companies engaged in the deal benefit) 
Documenting the benefits is of utmost importance for achieving validity of the analysis. 
To see what each side of deal gained is to understand what incentives were present. This reveals 
not only what the Chinese NOCs wanted to get, but also what they were ready to give away. This 
parameter reflects the bargaining process and the trade-offs of each activity. 
 
7) Risks (what risks the parties involved undertook) 
This parameter is useful to assess the risks involved in each activity and NOC’s readiness 
to take them. 
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8) Motives and growth options  
According to the literature review, four main types of motives can be identified: resource-
seeking, market-seeking, efficiency-seeking, and strategic asset/capability seeking activities. 
Growth options categorized according Igor Ansoff are manifestations of the organizational 
strategy specific to each case. 
 
9) Factors 
Important considerations that give a deeper insight into the deal. 
 
Based on these parameters we could assess, compare and analyze individual cases of 
internationalization activity of Sinopec Group and Sinopec Limited and eventually determine the 
high-level plan that stands behind them and the key factors that define it. To make the contents 
and the results of our research more accessible, we have put the most important details into a 
table (see Table 1), and concluded it with notes and prognosis for each studied case. Table 1 may 
serve as a reference list, if the reader wishes to trace the logic of the research, verify the data or 
use it to draw up his or her own conclusions. 
 
2.3 Validity and reliability of the research 
A qualitative as well as a quantitative research is considered contributing to the research 
field if it complies with a number of criteria, that is internal validity, external validity, construct 
validity and reliability (Golafshani 2003). Some scientists argue that reliability is a characteristic 
that can hardly be attached to a qualitative research, because it is hard to test the quality of its 
data and results. Still, transparency of the research can increase its reliability, because it allows 
others to repeat the process (Mariotto et al. 2014). Detailed description of each case and the 
accessibility of collected data contribute to the transparency of this research and enable it to 
reach a certain level of reliability. 
Internal and construct validity depend on a consistent causal structure and the presence of 
a clear chain of evidence respectively (Mariotto et. al 2014). The framework used to assess cases 
and consistent with the extensive theory described in the literature review increases both internal 
and construct validity. The framework enables the reader to trace the logic of the researcher and 
explain the causal connections between variables and outcomes. 
External validity is the greatest challenge for a qualitative research, because the statistical 
generalization it requires is hardly achievable. However, in this thesis the number of cases is 
relatively high, which helps to increase the validity (Mariotto et. al. 2014). Moreover, the results 
25 
 
of the research centered on Sinopec Group and Sinopec Limited are tested against data for 
another company, namely CNPC. This helps to increase external validity even further. 
 
2.4 Limitations of the research strategy 
The unique nature of cases lead to what is considered to be the main drawback of a 
qualitative research, that is ‘the inability to provide a basis for the generalization of results’ 
(Mariotto et al. 2012). It is hard to extend the findings to a wide population of cases. This 
problem is quite severe in case of this research because only one company is studied. This is 
compensated for by the representative nature of the company, the large number of case selected 
and the test of results against another company. 
Another problem is the challenge of presenting the findings in a clear and accessible way, 
so that the reader could see the significance and the contribution of the research (Pratt 2009; 
Strauss, Corbin 2003). To overcome this obstacle, we have attempted to present the research 
process in a structured table with parameters that have been previously justified and explained. 
This shifts the qualitative research toward the quantitative pole and increases the significance of 
the findings. 
Finally, the data used to describe the cases is somewhat limited. Although extensive data 
has been collected from analytical papers and business magazines (International Energy Agency, 
World Trade Organization, Bloomberg, Wall Street Journal, etc.), as well as from databases 
(Thomson Reuters, Bloomberg), the sensitive and politicized nature of the chosen subject means 
that some details may have not been disclosed. 
 
2.5 Summary of Chapter II 
The object of this research was identified as the internationalization strategy of Chinese 
NOCs. The unique nature of oil industry in China facilitated the work because one of the three 
largest companies is significantly smaller than the other two. The remaining companies, namely 
CNPC with its traded subsidiary PetroChina and Sinopec with its traded subsidiary Sinopec 
Limited, are similar in size, revenue and are governed by the same state commission SASAC. To 
narrow down the research, the revenue and the level of internationalization activity were taken 
into account. As mentioned above, out of 100 major deals with foreign governments and 
companies signed by Chinese NOCs from 2002 to 2015, over 30% involved Sinopec Group 
and/or Sinopec Limited, and out 10 mega deals (worth about or over $5 billion) Sinopec took 
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part in 5.  As a result, Sinopec Group and Sinopec Limited have been chosen to represent 
Chinese NOCs. 
Internationalization strategy can have multiple dimensions, and separate activities aimed 
at internationalization require a detailed in-depth study that takes into account contexts specific 
to each situation. This causes the need for a structured analysis of multiple cases describing 
internationalization activity. 
To increase the validity and reliability of research, multiple cases were selected, covering 
a wide geographical and typological range. Furthermore, the results of the research are tested 
against data for the other major oil company, CNPC. To make the logic and results more 
accessible, all important details from all cases were presented in a table structured according to 
certain parameters, that have been justified and selected based on theory presented in the 
literature review. 
The qualitative nature of the research imposes a number of limitations onto it. However, 
they are all addressed to and dealt with throughout the study. 
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Chapter III. Empirical study 
 
How to read the cases 
 
Cases are grouped by regions of activity. E.g. a total of two cases involve Saudi Aramco, 
a company from Saudi Arabia. One case describes a JV that operates in Saudi Arabia and can be 
found in the Middle East section, while another case is about a JV in China, and should be 
looked for in the Asia section. 
Each case starts with a brief introduction titled ‘Background’, to provide insights into 
the political, economic, and social environment surrounding the deal. Often, motives for Sinopec 
Group or Sinopec Limited to undertake particular actions and factors that shape the company’s 
strategy can be found in this introductory part. 
To help reader get a yet better grasp of the deal, information on the partner company or 
companies is provided in second part. It helps to see the internationalization activity manifested 
in the deal from a different perspective, i.e. from that of a foreign firm. It also complements the 
‘Background’ part and is useful for deeper understanding of the motives and factors driving the 
activity. 
The third part named ‘The Deal’ contains essential information on the outcome of the 
activity: structure of the JV, price paid for an acquisition, institutes that helped to finance the 
deal, etc. 
‘Opportunities and Threats’ provide author’s vision of the deal’s future that is based on 
the information presented in the case. 
The last part titled ‘Summary’ reviews the case and suggests an internationalization 
strategy presented in it. 
It is important to pay attention not only to the foreign firm or the internationalization 
activity itself, but also to the Chinese agent, since cases involve either Sinopec Group, which is a 
100% state-owned firm, or Sinopec Limited (or simply Sinopec), which is partially traded in 
stock exchange. The name of each case contains the name of the Chinese agent. 
Lastly, to facilitate the task of testing the final results of the analysis, each case is 
followed by a short summary of a similar case that involves another major Chinese NOC, CNPC 
and/or its traded subsidiary PetroChina. The only exception is the first case describing the 
strategic alliance between Chinese NOCs and the Development Bank of China, since it was more 
logical to include the deals of both Sinopec Group and CNPC into the body of one case. 
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Case 1. Strategic alliance with China Development Bank (Sinopec Group and CNPC) 
 
Background 
Chinese state-owned banks are an invaluable source of capital for Chinese NOCs. These 
banks provide money at low rates and cooperate with the companies during their international 
operations. One of the most important banks for NOCs is China Development Bank (CDB) that 
is often engaged in loan-for-oil and loan-for-gas projects. These deals are popular with other 
developing nations that lack infrastructure or need cash, but are not able to raise money 
internationally due to bad credit rating, slow growth, or sanctions. Venezuela, Brazil and Russia 
are among the countries that have worked with CDB.  In this type of deal, loan is provided 
directly to the international partner who in turn agrees to sell oil at market price to the bank’s 
Chinese partner. After oil or gas reach the Chinese company, it deposits money on CDB’s 
account that withdraws a portion of payment for itself to cover the interest and gives the rest 
back to the international partner. This way, the bank can be guaranteed secure and timely 
payment, while the NCO gets a good leverage during negotiations. 
 
China Development Bank (CDB) 
CDB is a 100% state-owned bank. Its activity is centered around profiting from China’s 
foreign and domestic policy objectives, such as strategic infrastructural change or energy 
security, which is crucial for China’s economic development and stability. The bank was created 
in mid-90’ to supply the pillar industries with cash. Back then the aim was to break the 
bottlenecks in transportation and energy, which was triggered by the economic growth of the 80’ 
and 90’. In 2000’ central government got concerned with shortages of natural resources 
including oil. This was also the point at which Chinese NOCs started to internationalize, initially 
to secure resources for China abroad. CDB followed the national champions and actively 
engaged in their overseas operations. Without this source of relatively cheap capital and the trust 
rooted in the fact that both NOCs and the bank belong to one ‘club’, internationalization of 
neither the oil companies, nor the CDB would have been possible. 
 
The deals 
China Development Bank and NOCs are part of a strategic alliance that secures profits 
for both the financial institution and the oil companies, at the same time fulfilling China’s 
foreign policy objectives. The scheme, widely referred to as ‘loan-for-oil’, has been implemented 
in dozens of deals around the world, but almost exclusively in developing nations that experience 
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financing difficulties. Two of the largest deals include the deal with Rosneft and Transneft, 
Russia worth $25 billion, and the loan given to Petrobras, Brazil that amounts $10 billion. 
In the first case, China Development bank issued a long-term loan (25 years) to Rosneft 
in 2009. The Russian company has to deliver a certain amount of oil annually to its Chinese 
counterpart (CNPC), while CNPC deposits the payment in CDB. CDB conducts checks and 
keeps the money that constitutes the interest payment, and only then transfers money to the crude 
oil producer. 
The second case is more recent and involves the troubled Brazilian NOC called Petrobras. 
The company was close to collapse with its debt to various creditors totaling over $20 billion, 
when CDB offered a $10 billion loan in exchange for oil supplied to Sinopec Group for a 
number of years. Petrobras accepted the terms and entered the ‘loan-for-oil’ agreement. Brazil, 
known for the relatively rigid rules for foreign companies working in its oil industry, also agreed 
to give preferential treatment to Chinese service firms when choosing partners for construction 
and development. 
 
Opportunities and threats 
The strategic alliance between CDB and Chinese NOCs has both political and 
commercial objectives. First of all, it gives CDB opportunity to find clients and expand 
internationally. Oil-exporting countries with non-diversified economies find themselves indebted 
when the prices go down. At the same time they tend to rely heavily on the exports of a single 
commodity, and the risk of giving up this business, especially when it is now financially tied to a 
single customer, is very low. This partially explains the very low non-performing loan rate of 
CDB that is about 1.2%. The NOCs, in turn, have their transactions secured, oil supplies 
guaranteed, and receive an additional leverage when dealing with foreign partners. Ultimately, 
this helps China tie oil producers to its finance and market, thus fulfilling the political agenda. 
The main threat is the volatility in oil prices that leads to the lengthy process of 
renegotiation. To mitigate the risks, oil companies agree to use the current market prices in their 
transactions, except for when the volatility gets too rough. 
 
Summary 
Deals involving the alliance between CDB and NOCs present a unique case of unity 
between state finance, government (which provides the political agenda) and oil companies, that 
are at least partially commercial. Significant loans are given to developing countries with strong 
state that do not allow foreign firms own strategic assets, but possess enormous resources. 
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Chinese NOCs can extract oil in other countries through JVs and even wholly-owned 
subsidiaries, so why do they engage in financing the troubled companies? In case of Russia, one 
of the reasons may be geographical proximity and possibility to directly transport oil to China. In 
case of Brazil, geographic considerations do not seem to work. However, we know (and shall see 
further) that Brazil possesses some of the largest oilfields in the world that could secure 
uninterrupted supply for many years to come. Besides, China can afford lending money at low 
rate which looks especially ‘heroic’ when other players withdraw. One can speculate that such 
behavior may bring political benefits in the future. In fact, Brazil has already promised to give 
preferential treatment to Chinese service companies as part of the deal, and this may prove to be 
only the beginning. 
 
Middle East 
Case 2. Yadavaran field deal in Iran (Sinopec Group) 
 
Background 
Political and economic ties between China and Iran date back to the early 1970s, when 
official relations were established, and China started buying hydrocarbons from the Middle 
Eastern country. Today, trade between the two countries is based on oil import to China and 
consumer goods/gasoline import to Iran. The latter is heavily dependent on China, because about 
30% of export goods go to that country.  
Iranian oilfields cannot be owned by foreign individuals or companies, but several 
specific investment schemes have been established in order to attract foreign cash and develop 
the Iranian oil industry. Almost all schemes include some sort of buyback, wherein investors 
supply facilities for production in exchange for the products that are then produced. After a 
number of years and upon completion of the buyback process, the facility is transferred to the 
Iranian government. Recent trends, however, point towards a more liberalized approach to 
investment, and most probably foreign companies will be allowed to eternally own and operate 
oil facilities independently or with an Iranian partner (Economist Intelligence Unit). 
 
NIOC 
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), Sinopec’s partner in the Yadavaran field deal, has 
the 2
nd
 largest proven oil reserves in the world (about 10%). It also enjoys exclusive rights to 
explore, extract, transport and export Iranian crude oil. The company is a monopolist and has 
unlimited control over Iran’s pillar industry. Currently, it is the 3rd largest oil company in the 
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world, after Saudi Aramco and Gazprom. The sanctions imposed on Iran over its nuclear 
program, have hit NIOC, causing investment shortage and decline in the number of customers. 
 
The deal 
Yadavaran Field is a large oil field located on the border with Iraq and co-owned with it. 
In December 2007 NIOC and Sinopec formed a joint venture with 51% belonging to the Chinese 
party in order to jointly develop the site and extract oil. The Chinese party invested over 2 billion 
dollars. China has been diversifying oil supply for more than two decades and access to the 
immense Iranian resources could be a crucial step for enhancing national security. 
Sinopec Group’s ‘brother’ from the SASAC-managed ‘family’, CNPC, had created a 
number of joint ventures in Iran before, with some being unsuccessful (Iran terminated contract 
for joint development of South Azadegan Field due to CNPC’s repeated delays on the project). 
Still, as all Western companies withdrew from Iran following the sanctions imposed on the 
country, Chinese companies have become dominant foreign actors in the country’s oil & gas 
industry. However, they did not show enough commitment and scaled down their activity in the 
country in the beginning of 2010s. Now as the sanctions are being uplifted, Chinese companies 
fear revenge for their indecisiveness, because European companies are coming back and their 
service level is generally much higher. To compensate for the possible complications, Sinopec 
Group is starting to actively pump oil at Yadavaran, with the output already reaching 80,000 bpd. 
 
Important considerations 
The joint venture between Sinopec and NIOC illustrates how closely hydrocarbon  
alliances are tied to politics. NIOC with its enormous resources was desperate to channel more 
financial resources and technological know-how into its oil industry and increase its market 
share. At the same time, the Iranian NOC needed a stable uninterrupted demand. Since the EU 
and US could not be considered as safe options anymore, Chinese companies have become the 
only viable opportunity. The timing was good, because Sinopec Group is constantly searching 
for more suppliers, over whom they could exercise a higher degree of bargaining power. For 
Sinopec Group, the Yadavaran deal was clearly a resource-seeking move. The company acquired 
rights to jointly develop one of the largest oilfields in the world, and currently controls the JV. 
The political factor, however, has slowed down the process, with almost no activity in 2010-
2014. As soon as it was announced that the sanctions may soon be uplifted, Sinopec Group 
renewed its activity to start producing more ahead of the change in political environment which 
would bring more international oil companies into the game.  
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It may seem that the alliance may turn out unstable. Sinopec Group’s delays signal that 
the US and EU political guidelines are something that the Chinese cannot ignore, and the 
situation may repeat. Zhuhai Zhenrong company, a refined oil products exporter, was sanctioned 
by the US for exporting gasoline to Iran, although the company claimed it never had done so. At 
the same time, Beijing signed a deal with Tehran in 2011, that gave Chinese companies 
exclusive access to several Iranian oil fields, Yadavaran being one of them. In exchange, China 
promised to treat foreign military intervention into these territories as attacks against its own 
sovereign land. This is an evidence of the ongoing political and military alliance between the two 
countries, despite the bad relationships with the West. 
 
Opportunities and threats 
Chinese companies were the only ones who kept dealing with Iran when the international 
oil industry literally pulled out from the country. This helped Sinopec secure a lucrative contract 
over a huge oilfield, and even have the majority of shares in the JV. The $2-billion investment as 
well as readiness to intervene militarily on Iranian soil in case of immediate threat to the project, 
demonstrate how seriously Chinese companies regard the potential of their projects in Iran.  
Low cost of extraction ($12 vs $9 in Saudi Arabia), the huge and relatively stable market 
and good relationship between the two countries, have made the Iranian projects of the highest 
priority for Sinopec. It can increase its market share, secure access to cheap oil, diversify 
portfolio of Middle Eastern partners. 
On the other hand, neither Sinopec Group alone, nor its Chinese ‘brothers’ are able to 
provide the money and technology needed to take the Iranian oil industry to the next level. This 
is why the uplifting of sanctions and inflow of Western IOCs with superior technology and 
managerial capabilities, is a serious threat for Sinopec Group. Iran has recently announced that it 
would increase oil production to over 4 million barrels/day, and none of the Chinese companies 
are able to support such an increase. Although politically stable, Iran has tense relationships with 
many of its neighbors, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Both countries are part of OPEC, 
US allies in the Middle East and Sunni-dominated societies. This make the threat of political and 
even military conflict and the resulting disruptions and sanctions quite high. 
To curb the threat of newcomers, Sinopec Group has been trying to form barriers to entry 
by pumping more oil and increasing its involvement in Iran. However, as long as investment 
stays at the present level, and technological know-how Sinopec Group brings in is not up to the 
IOCs standards, the threat will keep rising. As for the threat of political and military conflict, 
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China has been trying to leverage Iranian influence in the region by creating a military alliance 
and pumping money into the country’s economy. 
 
Summary 
Sinopec Group invested 2 billion dollars into a joint upstream oil venture in Iran which it 
now largely controls. Foreign companies are not allowed to own or solely explore natural 
resources in Iran, therefore the JV form was used. However, the size of investment, Iran’s hunger 
for cash, and the ongoing sanctions helped Sinopec secure the majority of shares. The country, 
although having a strong state, was in no position to dictate its terms, and Sinopec managed to 
exploit the situation. 
Sinopec Group benefited from the lack of competition in the 2010s, and had backing 
from the China’s government, that allied with Iran both politically and militarily. Sinopec Group 
was somewhat sensitive to the political factor and stopped its activity when the sanctions 
imposed on Iran over its nuclear program were the toughest. However, the activity never stopped 
completely, and Sinopec along with Zhuhai Zhenrong (state-owned oil trading company) are 
now Iran’s largest crude oil buyers.  
Both commercial and geopolitical factor play a significant role in this case. Sinopec 
Group is successfully using the opportunities presented by the Iranian oil industry, however the 
threat of new entrants is growing. To curb it, Sinopec Group has been trying to create barriers to 
entry, but the current investment level and the know-how that the Iranians could acquire through 
technology transfer are not enough to keep IOCs away from the lucrative market. 
Finally, Sinopec Group’s strategy in Iran is resource- and market-seeking, since its 
activity does not include construction of downstream facilities and most oil extracted in Iran is 
then imported to the PRC and sold back as gasoline and petrochemicals. 
 
CNPC and North Azadegan Field in Iran 
The 100% state-owned CNPC has been present in Iran since mid-2000, but its best 
contracts came in 2010’, following the withdrawal of Western companies. E.g. CNPC replaced 
Total in one of the deals, getting its 12.5% stake worth $13 billion in South Pars oilfield JV with 
NIOC. Even more representative of CNPC’s recent activity in Iran is a joint venture established 
with NIOC to explore the giant North Azadegan field in 2009. CNPC owns a 70% stake in the 
business under a buyback contract. 
  
34 
 
Case 3. Saudi Aramco and Sinopec JV YASREF refinery in Yanbu city, Saudi 
Arabia (Sinopec Group) 
 
Background 
Cooperation between Saudi Arabia and China has been intensifying throughout the last 
decade reaching its high after 2010. At the moment, China is Saudi Arabia’s largest trading 
partner and Sinopec is Saudi Aramco’s largest crude oil trading partner and onshore drilling 
service provider (Bloomberg 2016). 
 
The deal 
A major deal was signed between Saudi Aramco and Sinopec in 2012 to create a JV 
refinery called YASREF (Yanbu Aramco Sinopec Refinery) based in Yanbu industrial city in 
Saudi Arabia. Both companies stated that they wanted to extract more value across the value 
chain by developing their downstream capabilities. The investment was estimated to be $10 
billion, with Sinopec having a 37.5% stake in the JV and Saudi Aramco 62.5%. The refinery was 
supposed to start operations in 2014, but the first shipment was made in 2015. At the moment, 
refining capacity of the YASREF refinery is estimated to reach 400,000 barrels/day by 2020, 
which makes it one the largest in the industry. 
The deal represents the deepening cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia. A 
memorandum was signed between Saudi Aramco and Sinopec during  president Xi Jinping’s 
visit to Riyadh, which points out the importance of political factor involved in the process. 
YASREF’s produce is distributed both domestically and internationally, with a major portion 
being shipped to China. 
 
Opportunities and threats 
Sinopec’s JV in Saudi Arabia marks involves enormous investment, some degree of 
political risk, and lack of control over the business. The fact that the company agreed to the 
minority share signifies its willingness to expand into international downstream  activity with 
higher margins. Opportunities presented by the deal include acquisition of a larger stake in the 
JV, accumulation of knowledge of international downstream operations and extraction of more 
value from sales in China. Processing may also allow Sinopec benefit from the crude oil price 
volatility. 
At the same time, the majority of shares held by Saudi Aramco enables it to control the 
JV and may lead to an eventual takeover, which has already happened with American companies 
in the 20
th
 century. Saudi Arabia’s oil policy (the country’s ability to influence oil prices remains 
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very strong) can diverge from the JVs interests that focus on increasing sales and maximization 
of margins and profits. 
 
Summary 
Sinopec’s deal in Saudi Arabia is one the largest overseas investment projects for the 
company. It has multiple objectives, the main being expansion into downstream sector and 
extraction of more profit from the value chain. More such projects may follow, as the YASREF 
refinery has been operating successfully so far. At the same time, the deal is clearly aligned with 
the government’s objective to diversify suppliers and enhance energy security, which is 
highlighted by President Xi’s visit to Riyadh. The deal involves some degree of risk due to the 
possibility of takeover (Sinopec owns 37.5% of shares, because no foreign companies can hold 
majority in oil industry enterprises in Saudi Arabia) and diverging interests with Saudi Arabia’s 
government. The first can be mitigated by leveraging projects involving Saudi Arabia in China, 
while the latter requires political communication between the largest supplier and the largest 
consumer of oil.  
The prospects of cooperation are positive due to Riyadh’s ‘look east’ policy and its quest 
for diversification of economy. Saudi Arabia needs stable markets for its oil and newly 
introduced petrochemicals, that wouldn’t question its domestic policy, and Asia accounting for 
2/3 of the country’s oil exports looks like the right choice. From the political point of view, 
Saudi Arabia remains closely tied to the USA, because its military influence in the region 
remains largely unsurpassed, and China is not ready to rival the Americans. 
Sinopec’s strategy is multi-layered and involves vertical integration and strategic alliance, 
while the political factor is not playing a very important role. 
 
CNPC in Niger 
While Sinopec Group holds a minority stake in the JV refinery in Saudi Arabia, CNPC 
has managed to gain control over a large refiner in Niger. The company has a 60% stake in the 
Zinder refinery project, the rest is owned by the Niger government. Having the majority of 
shares allows CNPC to effectively control the venture, assigning top managers and setting up the 
desired HR-policy. This is done to secure operations because of the political risks present in this 
African nation with relatively weak institutions. 
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The Americas 
Case 4. Repsol Sinopec Brazil in Santos Basin, Brazil (Sinopec Group)  
 
Background 
Brazil is one of the largest markets in South America and in the world, and has a long 
history of official relations with the PRC dating back to 1974. Brazil-China relations have 
reached a new level in the mid-2000s, when economic cooperation intensified. By 2009 China 
had become Brazil’s largest trade partner and an important investor focusing on natural resources. 
Today, Brazil has a relatively open oil and gas industry. Before 1997, Petrobras was the 
only company that could own and operate oilfields, but the barriers were uplifted and foreign 
NOCs and IOCs entered the country. In the 2010s, the ruling Worker’s Party issued a regulation 
that considered offshore oil and gas reserves as highly strategic, and foreign companies operating 
them were forced to establish JVs with Petrobras with the latter having at least 30% of shares. It 
is worth mentioning that such regulations are common in South America: Mexican oil industry is 
dominated by only one state-owned company, and Repsol’s largest asset in Argentina the firm 
called YPF has recently been nationalized by the government (which agreed to repay Repsol, but 
it declined on the grounds that the sum was insufficient). At the same time, requirements for 
local content in Brazil (workforce and technology) were raised, which would drive up the costs. 
Following the new regulations, Brazil’s state-controlled giant faced tremendous financial and 
managerial challenges. In 2015 China Development Bank issued a $10 billion loan to Petrobras 
with one of the terms being that the money would be used to purchase Chinese services and 
materials. 
 
Repsol 
Repsol is an integrated global energy company with headquarters in Spain. It operates in 
Europe, Americas, Africa, and Asia. The company is very innovative and boasts a high 
exploration success rate of about 38% (industry average is 20-25%). 
Repsol is one the leading private energy companies in South America. It owned the 
largest energy company in Argentina until 2012, when the government nationalized the asset 
causing outcry among the shareholders and international business community. The company was 
also one of the earliest entrants into the Brazilian market in 1997 following the liberalization of 
country’s oil industry. Today, Repsol holds a vast portfolio in Brazil, and after entering a 
strategic alliance with Sinopec and creating a JV called Repsol Sinopec in 2010, it received 
additional funding. This has led to exploration of some of the largest offshore reserves in Brazil. 
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The deal 
The deal between Repsol and Sinopec was signed in 2010. The former held a capital 
increase of over $7 billion, while the latter subscribed to it entirely. The resulting company is 
controlled by Repsol holding 60% of shares and now named Repsol Sinopec Brazil. 
Additional funding that Sinopec provided was used to expand the operations and upgrade 
the existing technology. Brazil’s oil reserves are immense, but most of them are hidden in the 
offshore area about 5-7 kilometers deep, beneath a layer of extremely hard mineral salts. This 
means that exploration and extraction of such oil is very costly and requires very good expertise 
as well as stable funding and political guarantees. Repsol has some of the best technologies in 
the field and had been working in Brazil ever since foreign companies were allowed to enter the 
huge South American market. Sinopec, being backed by the government, has cash and political 
leverage that such an undertaking would require. These considerations brought the two giants 
together, and the JV turned out very successful. Repsol Sinopec Brazil has discovered its first 
major oilfield in the offshore area of Santos basin, Brazil. Another big discovery was made in 
2015. The regulations have made it obligatory for the company to operate the projects with the 
state-owned company Petrobras (30%). Another company that joined the exploration is 
Norway’s giant Statoil. 
 
Opportunities and threats 
Brazil is one of the major exporters and consumers of oil, and its role in the Americas 
will keep growing, especially considering the closeness of Mexico’s oil industry and the 
depleting resources in Argentina. For Sinopec, having a foothold in Brazil, means operating in a 
low-risk, high-potential environment with access to some of the largest consumers, the USA. 
Sinopec’s share in the JV is quite significant, and acquisition of Repsol’s shares seems to be a 
viable option, especially given the complicated situation in South America the company is facing 
at the moment (renationalization of its assets in Argentina). The operations also allow for a 
technology transfer that could be used to develop offshore oil in China. 
On the other hand, Brazil has entered a period of relative instability and the current 
political environment in South America looks unwelcoming for foreign oil giants. Social 
situation in Brazil may deteriorate and Sinopec’s efforts may be ruined just as Repsol’s were in 
Argentina. 
Therefore, the best option would probably be to keep operating as usual with attempting 
to take over Repsol’s share. To mitigate the political risk, Sinopec should use its political 
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leverage provided by China Development Bank, but not push too hard, because the situation 
remains somewhat unclear. 
 
Summary 
Sinopec entered the JV with Repsol trading its political and financial capabilities for 
technology and access to Brazilian oilfields. Brazilian offshore resources are considered to be 
some of the largest in the world, and are located in close proximity to customers with relatively 
low political risk. In a few years after the JV was launched, Sinopec Repsol Brazil ended up 
establishing a venture with some of the largest private and state-owned companies, some of 
which possess the most modern oil exploration and extraction technology (Repsol, Statoil). 
Repsol wouldn’t be able to carry out a project of this scale without Sinopec’s financial leverage, 
while Sinopec could never explore such reserves on its own. 
Another important factor that influenced the successful outcome of the project was China 
Development Bank’s giving loan to Petrobras, Brazil’s major state-controlled oil company. It 
promised to repay the $10 billion loan with oil that would be sold to Sinopec. This way, Sinopec 
acquired political leverage over Petrobras, which must be included into any offshore project in 
the country. 
 
CNPC and the Libra Oilfield in Brazil 
In 2013, CNPC has won a bid as a part of consortium to explore the giant offshore Libra 
field in Brazil. The consortium is comprised of the state-controlled Petrobras (40%), Shell (20%), 
Total (20%), CNOOC (10%), and CNPC (10%). The oilfield lies beneath a layer of mineral salts 
and is very challenging, however, the technical expertise of the IOCs will help to overcome the 
difficulties and eventually reach an output of 1.5 million barrels/day, according to the Brazilian 
government. 
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Case 5. Devon Energy, USA (Sinopec Group) 
 
Background 
World economy and politics largely depend on the relations between China and the 
United States. First comprehensive contacts between the two nations date back to the 19
th
 
century. After the revolution in China and the long period of infighting that ended in 1949, the 
relations became somewhat tense, because China went the socialist way and partnered up with 
the Soviet Union. In the 1970s, the United States government, recognizing the importance of 
China’s role in the modern world, finally established official diplomatic relations with the PRC, 
and the long story of both aligned and conflicting interests started. 
One important issue between China and the United States arises from the difference 
between the two economic systems. US is an opened market economy that allows investment 
and JVs in virtually all industries, as long as the business does not pose immediate danger to 
national security. Chinese economy is more regulated, and no free investment is allowed in a 
number of strategic industries. Energy sector is controlled by the government and any deal taking 
place on Chinese soil requires approval.  
US energy sector is run by private companies, which results in US customers paying 
market prices for energy sources. Chinese state-controlled companies started to make big-scale 
acquisitions in the mid-2000’ causing concern among many Americans. However, historians and 
economists reminded them of the recent past when the Japanese started buying assets, importing 
goods, and even establishing production in the country. Eventually, when the boom ended, it 
turned out that the US customers enjoyed an improved competitive market, and the some of the 
precious assets the Japanese had bough, were being transferred back. 
 
Devon Energy 
Devon Energy is a major US company specializing in exploration and production of oil 
and gas in North America. It is a major shale oil and gas producer, and is listed in Fortune 500. 
The company was started in 1971, and has accumulated vast experience in the industry. At the 
moment, it holds considerable stakes in some of the US largest shale gas- and oilfields and 
operates them successfully using the hydraulic fracturing technique. 
 
The deal 
Sinopec Group acquired a 1/3 stake in five major projects carried out by Devon Energy in 
2012. The deal worth $2.5 billion was the second such investment by a Chinese company in the 
US, the first being an acquisition made by CNOOC (3
rd
 largest NOC in China). The latter also 
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acquired a 33.3% stake in a number of projects belonging to Cheapsake Energy, another major 
private oil and gas company listed in Fortune 500. 
The deal went through a smooth approval process with no concerns raised over a 
minority stake in a limited number of projects. According to analysts, Sinopec Group paid a 20% 
premium, because the market expectations were that the deal would not exceed $2 billion. The 
deal was signed in 2012, when the fracturing fever almost reached its high, and the premium can 
be explained by Sinopec’s desire to have access to the best technology. Under the agreement, the 
two companies were supposed to jointly explore 5 drilling sites, moving facilities from one site 
to the next one if the desired conditions are not found. 
At the moment (2016) Devon Energy is seeking to sell off of part of its assets to lower 
debt in the wake of the ongoing oil price crisis. Sinopec Group, however, hasn’t yet taken its 
chance because of the oil price uncertainty, China’s economy slowdown and the ‘surprisingly’ 
high prices for the US assets. 
 
Opportunities and threats 
A joint venture with a US-based company required thorough preparation, because the 
Americans have blocked major deals before (CNOOC, a smaller NOC from China, has 
attempted to buy California-based Unocal for $18 billion in 2005, but the deal was blocked by 
the US government). To keep a low profile, Sinopec Group agreed to a minority stake in the 
project. The deal also implied higher costs due to strong institutions related to workers’ rights 
and environmental regulations. However, the company went on with the JV in order to get access 
to the strategically important technology that could be used in China for domestic shale oil and 
gas. A takeover of Devon’s stake does not seem as a feasible opportunity, but technology 
transfer that will lead to Sinopec’s own progress, is almost certain. 
The main threat is Sinopec’s lack of experience of working in North America. Cultural 
distance may lead to complications when it comes to legal compliance, which in turn may result 
in fines and reputational damage. However, the strategic importance of deal implies that the 
Chinese will do their best to establish a solid foothold in the highly competitive nd 
technologically advanced North American market. 
 
Summary 
The deal between Sinopec Group and Devon Energy deserves special attention because it 
is the first case of internationalization in a developed free-market economy. It clearly 
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demonstrates that Sinopec Group can comply with the necessary regulations and operate in an 
environment with highly developed institutions. 
At the first glance, the deal does not involve political agenda. The nature of the US 
energy market implies that China wouldn’t be able to have any significant influence over the 
highly diverse and competitive industry in that country. China’s partner is major Fortune 500 
company, yet it is one of the many similar firms. The premium Sinopec Group paid for the 
minority stake hints at the reasons behind the deal. Devon Energy, being one of the earliest 
companies to start using hydraulic fracturing to extract the so-called tight oil and gas, has some 
latest drilling technology and knows how to efficiently manage unconventional oilfields. China, 
in turn, has the world’s largest known shale oil and gas reserves in the world (more than US and 
Canada combined), but most of them belong to the ‘tight’ type and require application of 
sophisticated technology. Hence, internationalization into the relatively unfamiliar free US 
market helps to kill two birds with one stone. First, Sinopec Group diversifies its business by 
investing into a JV with a highly-efficient private company. Second, the Chinese can acquire 
technology by looking over Devon’s shoulder. This technology will help Sinopec Group develop 
its own projects in China, which is of strategic importance for the government. Therefore, the 
political agenda is still present, and the interests of the company and of the government are 
closely aligned. 
 
PetroChina in shale gas deal with Shell in Canada 
PetroChina, a traded arm of CNPC, paid over $1 billion for a 20% stake in Royal Dutch 
Shell’s shale oil and gas project in Canada in 2012. The company’s representatives 
acknowledged that one of the main reasons was technology transfer that would happen through 
the venture. The company could then bring the technology back to China and explore its local 
resources. Other considerations were the production and access to the North American market. 
 
Africa 
Case 6. Acquisition of Addax Petroleum (Sinopec Group)   
 
Background 
China first entered African oil and gas in 1990’, but Middle East remained its main 
supplier of hydrocarbons until 2000’. 9/11 and the war in Iraq have influenced China’s decision 
to diversify from the turbulent region and engage more actively in expansion into Africa, despite 
the risks involved. The first operations were launched in Sudan notorious for its instability, and 
by 2009 the PRC had business in over 20 African nations. 
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Most of the times, Chinese companies form joint ventures with local players and IOCs to 
secure access to the upstream sector. Downstream activities are confined to nations that possess 
both significant resources and large markets, such as Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, and Egypt. Since 
China was a latecomer to the African oil and gas, it had to offer something that its rivals could 
not. To increase competitiveness, Chinese NOCs entered a strategic alliance with state-owned 
banks with China Development Bank as the main partner. The banks would give loans to local 
firms and governments without transparency or human rights requirements, unlike the IMF or 
other Western institutions. This fuelled corruption, but helped China gain a foothold on the 
continent. 
However, it was relatively difficult for Chinese NOCs to compete with IOCs that had 
been present in Africa for decades. To overcome the problem, another tool was applied, namely 
acquisitions. One of the most significant ones was the acquisition of Addax Petroleum, a 
company that had rights to many oilfields across Africa and the Middle East.  
 
Addax Petroleum 
Addax Petroleum is an integrated oil company with international operations based in 
Switzerland and publicly traded in the UK and Canada. It was a part of Addax and Orix Group of 
companies also based in Switzerland, and became an independent company in 1994. The parent 
company had business all over the world, including West Africa and the Middle East. Addax 
Petroleum used the know-how it inherited from the Group and expanded rapidly. By the time of 
Chinese takeover, it accumulated extensive assets in Nigeria (since 1998, shared production 
agreements with Nigerian National Oil Company, various other projects, some with 100% 
ownership), Cameroon (since 2002, offshore sites, varying degrees of ownership, up to 70%), 
Gabon (since 2006, onshore and offshore, varying degrees of ownership, up to 100%), and Iraq’s 
Kurdistan region (since 2005, joint venture with Iraqi government). Company’s total daily output 
reached 136,000 barrels and it had more than 500 million barrels of reserves by 2009. 
 
The deal 
Addax Petroleum was going through a hard period in 2009 when Sinopec contacted the 
company and offered what would become Chinese NOCs’ largest foreign acquisition up to date. 
The acquisition cost Sinopec $8.27 billion. The company retained its name but changed the logo, 
and continued its operations as if nothing happened. Sinopec continued to finance the ongoing 
projects and even expanded their scope, especially in Iraq, where China’s presence is the most 
significant among all other nationals. China opposed military intervention into Iraq in 2003, and 
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after the war ended it became largest importer of Iraq’s oil (1/2 in 2013). Addax’s assets were 
the first major foothold of Chinese NOCs in the country, and other companies followed the lead 
(CNPC in 2014). 
 
Opportunities and threats 
Sinopec has secured significant resources in Africa and the Middle East. They can be 
regarded as ‘leftovers’ because of the political and social instability the region has become 
notorious for. However, the lack of institutions may be beneficial for the Chinese, who know 
how to operate in such environments and can establish wholly owned subsidiaries or joint 
ventures with majority shares here. This will increase the stability of crude oil supply. Another 
important consideration is the market size of the nations where the oilfields are located. Not only 
will the company benefit from the supply, but it can also build more refineries and sell final 
products in local markets. 
However, the turbulent regions of Africa and the Middle East will remain high-risk 
environment for many years to come. High levels of corruption, a direct result of 
underdeveloped institutions, can make any business unprofitable. Chinese NOCs are currently 
contributing to further deterioration of the situation by providing low-interest loans from CDB 
without requesting disclosures and transparency. Therefore, the main threat remains political 
instability that is a curse of almost any ‘failed state’. To mitigate the risk, Chinese NOCs need to 
manage their financial aid and investment very carefully delivering at least part of them through 
secure channels that will reduce social tension. 
 
Summary 
Acquisition of a European company with extensive assets in the developing world is not 
an end in itself. The deal fully complies with Sinopec’s strategy of direct geographical expansion 
into countries with weak institutions, and Chinese government’s energy security policy that 
implies diversification of supplier nations. 
Sinopec’s acquisition is highly representative of the magnificent turn that the Big Chinese 
Business took following the world financial crisis. China’s government accumulated vast cash 
deposits and was able to give loans at incredibly low rates. The NOCs took advantage of cheap 
money and low prices for high-class assets, and made a strategic move that worked both 
financially and politically. 
Addax’s portfolio looks as if it was tailored for Sinopec. Decent oilfields in African 
countries with relatively poor institutions – the environment the Chinese can comfortably fit in, 
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and Iraq, feeling betrayed by the West. China’s investment the three countries Addax has 
business in (Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon) is jaw-dropping, it seems that the PRC is omnipotent 
and is building local infrastructure out of good will. Of course, the Chinese are getting paid, with 
their own money though, that is given to African nations beforehand on the condition that the 
capital is used for Chinese goods and services. Some argue that this is neo-colonialism, but at 
least the Chinese and their NOCs exercise a very high degree of bargaining power over the 
African nations, and it is hard to overestimate their dependence on the Asian giant. 
Sinopec’s loyalty to its Iraqi partner (i.e. the Iraqi government) can be observed in the 
low-margin agreements that the company has signed with it after the acquisition of Addax 
Petroleum. The fact that the Western companies were not willing to get involved in risky 
business without being guaranteed high returns, while their Chinese peers (CNPC purchased 
oilfields in Iraq from ExxonMobil in 2013) lined up for the treat, reveals the political agenda 
behind the deals and highlights its significance. 
CNPC in Africa and Iraq 
In Africa, CNPC is present in Chad, Niger, Nigeria, South Sudan and Sudan. The latter 
two are some of the least stable countries in the world. So far, CNPC had built one refinery in 
Chad, in which it owns 60%, the rest belonging to the Chad government. The refinery and a 
power generation station attached to it supply the country’s capital with electricity and are 
crucial for Chad’s security. CNPC’s degree of participation in projects in other African countries 
varies, but is usually below 50% if the other company is an IOC such as Shell. When the other 
party is local government, CNPC usually controls the joint venture by holding the majority of 
shares. CNPC’s involvement in Iraq has also been rather significant, but since no major 
acquisitions were made and the Chinese company has been a latecomer to the Middle east, most 
of its projects are minority-share  joint ventures with IOCs, such as BP or ExxonMobil. 
 
China 
Case 7. Exxon Mobile, Saudi Aramco,  and Sinopec JV refinery in Fujian Province 
(Sinopec Limited) 
 
Background 
Diplomatic relations between China and Saudi Arabia were established in 1990, when the 
Middle Eastern country already had 40 years of relations with Taiwan. Saudi Arabia is 
considered to be China’s ‘strategic partner’, although the backbone of cooperation is oil (Al-
Tamini 2012). Other important spheres of cooperation include aluminum, air transportation, 
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railroad construction and weapons trade. In most cases, the PRC provides technology and know-
how to its partner. 
 
Saudi Aramco 
The only entity that owns, explores and operates oilfields is Saudi Arabia is Saudi 
Aramco, the largest oil company in the world and the most influential member of the OPEC. The 
company is owned by the royal family of Saudi Arabia, but originally it belonged to several US 
firms (hence the name ‘Aramco’ – Arabian American Oil Company), that started exploration in 
the beginning of the 20
th
 century and brought in the necessary technology and know-how. United 
States used to be Saudi Aramco’s largest partner, but the ‘look east’ policy adopted in mid-2000s 
led to China becoming the largest consumer of Arabian oil. Today, the company invests into 
China to create a network of refineries to process its crude oil and get closer to the market. 
 
Exxon Mobil 
Exxon Mobil, descendant of John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil, is the world’s largest 
supermajor (i.e. IOC or internationally owned company), although it accounts for only 3% of 
total oil production in the world. At the same time, it is one of the most profitable companies 
according to Fortune 500, and the largest oil refiner in the world with some of the most advanced 
knowledge and strongest brands in the industry. 
 
The deal 
The refinery in Quanzhou, Fujian province, has raised nearly $4 billion and is the largest 
Sino-foreign financing project on Chinese soil up to date. The deal was signed between Sinopec, 
Exxon Mobile, and Saudi Aramco to modernize and triple the production capacity of the existing 
oil refining facility to 240,000 barrels/day (Saudi Arabia’s total output is about 10 mln 
barrels/day) by 2009, and add a number of production units (polyethylene, polypropylene, etc.). 
The project was partially financed by Saudi Arabia ($1 billion), while the rest was provided by 
11 Chinese state-owned banks, including China Development Bank. Sinopec owns 50% of the 
JV, Exxon Mobil and Saudi Aramco each hold a 25% stake. In addition to the refinery and 
production, the companies also entered a marketing JV that would operate 750 filling stations 
across Fujian. The project is unique because it brings together the largest producer from the 
Middle East, the largest refiner in China, and the largest market. The companies are putting their 
strengths and know-how together to operate with the largest possible profit. 
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It is important to note that the production units of the updated refinery are able to process 
some kinds of Arabian oil that could not be processed before (the so-called distressed oil), which 
highlights the fact that the facilities were built specifically to deal with imports from Saudi 
Arabia.  
The refinery has reached the planned output, and the JV is functioning as of April, 2016.  
 
Opportunities and threats 
Although Saudi Aramco is the largest oil exporter in the world, it finds the growing 
competition from other companies and unconventional oil producers more and more threatening. 
It is therefore trying to expand into sector. However, access to the most lucrative markets is quite 
limited and the deal with Sinopec and Exxon Mobile presents a very good opportunity. 
Sinopec has exploited its home country benefits (market size) and attracted Arabian 
money and international expertise to expand its own business in China. At the same time, a JV 
between the largest exporter and the largest importer could add stability to the value chain and 
make the relations with Saudi Arabia more predictable. From this perspective, political and 
commercial interests are aligned with each other. Expertise from Exxon Mobil must have been 
an important consideration for the other two companies, since its knowledge of the downstream 
sector and the valuable brands it has are an invaluable asset for a refining project. 
On the other hand, a big-scale deal with a Sunni-dominated country claiming leadership 
in the Middle East may hurt relationship with Iran, another big player in the region and a 
potential major partner of China in oil trade. Obviously, the political factor plays a less important 
role in the deal, but it could turn into an obstacle in the future. 
 
Summary 
Oil and gas being one of China’s pillar industries crucial to its energy security is a 
relatively closed market with foreign companies not allowed to hold majority in big projects. 
The creation of a JV between ExxonMobil (25%), Saudi Aramco (25%) and Sinopec 
(50%) was therefore the only option for the foreign companies to directly enter China. The scale 
of investment implies commitment from all parties, which is an evidence of good intentions of 
Saudi Aramco, China’s largest oil supplier. Upon the completion of project, another JV was 
launched, only this time in Saudi Arabia and with Sinopec Group (see below). Hence, the JV in 
Fujian province can be regarded as a part of mutual investments made to cement the ‘oil 
friendship’ between China and Saudi Arabia. At the same time, the fact that the two companies 
lack expertise to produce and operate downstream facilities at a highly profitable international 
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level led to ExxonMobil’s participating in the deal. Its importance is embodied in the 25% share, 
the same as Saudi Aramco’s. ExxonMobil is also a long-established trusted partner of the 
Chinese oil industry, especially of PetroChina, CNPC’s traded arm. 
Through the JV, Sinopec cemented its relationship with its biggest supplier while 
securing supply for many years to come, gained more international-level expertise in 
downstream sector and opportunity to benefit from ExxonMobil’s strong brand, and found 
investment needed to set up giant production that would increase company’s market share and 
penetration level. 
 
Saudi Aramco and PetroChina JV Refinery in Yunnan province 
State-owned Saudi Aramco representing the top oil exporter in the world has signed the 
deal with CNPC’s traded arm PetroChina to construct a large-scale refinery in the southern 
province of Yunnan, China. The deal took place in 2011, and the refinery was successfully 
launched some years later. The value of the deal has not been disclosed, however construction of 
a refinery of such scale (200,000 barrels per day refining capacity) would cost several billion US 
dollars. Under the agreement, PetroChina would act as an investor and a distributor of the final 
product, while Saudi Aramco would also invest into construction and supply crude oil under a 
separate long-term contract. The former holds 51% of the JV, Saudi Aramco has 39%, and the 
rest belongs to a local firm. The deal is very similar to that signed between Aramco, Sinopec 
Limited and ExxonMobil, and helps to cement the ties between the largest exporter and the 
largest importer of crude oil. 
 
Case 8. Royal Dutch Shell in China (Sinopec Limited)   
 
Background 
Most IOCs in China operate in the downstream sector (Exxon Mobil, Shell, Eni, etc.), 
however, the recent findings that put China on the 1
st
 place by proven shale oil and gas reserves, 
have attracted these companies into the upstream sector, while opening up local companies to 
cooperation at the same time. China does not possess the necessary technology to explore and 
operate shale reserves on its own and has to consider giving part of its resources ‘away’ under 
joint exploration or shared product agreements. The active phase of cooperation started in 2010’ 
when the US shale boom proved successful. Given the stable and predictable demand for oil and 
gas in the local market, as well as the protectionist nature of Chinese economic system, 
exploration within the country looks like a sure bet for IOCs. 
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Royal Dutch Shell 
Royal Dutch Shell (Shell) is an integrated oil company that operates in about 90 countries 
and covers all sectors of the oil industry. It produces over 3 million barrels of oil/day and is one 
of the most profitable organizations in the world. Shell’s expertise in all sectors of the industry 
can be attributed to its long history that dates back to the beginning of the 20
th
 century, when its 
first operations started in Georgia that was then a part of the Russian Empire. 
Shell has been present in China since early 20
th
 century. The company has maintained 
good relations with the government after the PRC was established in 1949. Its office in Shanghai 
remained open until 1966. In the 1980’ Shell was one of the first supermajors to re-enter China. 
After the US market – main focus of shale oil and gas exploration companies – became 
too competitive, major players started looking for investment opportunities in other parts of the 
world. Shell chose China because of its long history of successful cooperation with local firms, 
and the fact that this Asian country has tremendous unexplored proven resources. 
 
The deal 
In 2012, Sinopec and Royal Dutch Shell agreed on a shared production contract that 
would require the IOC to invest about $1 billion/year into exploration of shale oil and gas in 
China’s Western regions. The company would be get paid back by the to-be extracted oil and gas. 
This could then be transported to ports and shipped elsewhere or directly to Shell’s JV refineries 
set up with other Chinese NOCs. Sinopec would exclusively operate the fields. 
Shell became the first international oil company to secure a contract in China’s shale oil 
and gas sector. Others, such as BP, Exxon Mobil, Eni, Total, etc. followed. 
The deal happened the same year Sinopec Corporation’s parent company Sinopec Group 
purchased a 1/3 stake in 5 of US-based Devon Energy’s major shale oil and gas projects. This 
shows the NOC’s appetite for shale gas projects and its eagerness to have the necessary 
technology. 
 
Opportunities and threats 
Clearly, one of the main drivers for Sinopec is the opportunity to get the necessary 
technology and share the risks of early exploration with a major foreign company. There is an 
industrial approach to drilling, and the learning curve applies to it as well. As soon as Shell and 
Sinopec drill enough probes, the Chinese company will be able to replicate the technology in its 
other projects, while keeping the original deal going. 
49 
 
On the other hand, shale oil and gas is more expensive to explore and extract than the 
conventional reserves, and even the slightest price fluctuations may affect the attractiveness of 
such ventures. This is happening now, when Shell is scaling down its originally $1 billion/year 
investment and looking for other opportunities elsewhere. The risk for Sinopec is not very 
significant though, because under a product sharing agreement, the domestic party does not 
invest and pays its partner back by sharing the oil extracted from the jointly discovered fields. 
 
Summary 
Oil and Gas is one of the strategic pillar industries that the Chinese government pays a lot 
of attention to and generally does not allow foreign companies operate in. The recently 
discovered shale oil and gas reserves in China are the largest in the world, but local players do 
not have enough expertise to efficiently explore them. Commercial companies can benefit from 
extracting oil in such proximity from a huge market that also strives for energy security. 
Therefore, IOCs were eager to enter joint ventures with Chinese companies to secure ‘seats in 
the front row’. Although the political agenda behind the deal is quite transparent, the commercial 
factor plays the leading role, which is highlighted by the fact that the partially traded Sinopec 
Limited is taking part in the venture, not its state-owned parent Sinopec Group. Regarded as a 
‘sure bet’, the joint venture may increase Sinopec’s value tremendously and benefit its main 
shareholder, the government. 
 
Royal Dutch Shell and PetroChina 
Shell and PetroChina have a number of JVs across China. Most projects involve 
unconventional oil and gas, which implies the use of Shell’s sophisticated technology and know-
how. PetroChina holds majority stake in all projects or cooperates with Shell under production-
sharing agreements. 
 
Executive summary 
 
Sinopec Limited was established as an independent company in 2000 and was 
simultaneously listed in Hong Kong, New York, London, and later in Shanghai. It received its 
asset base from Sinopec Group, China’s main oil refiner and distributor at that time, and focused 
on operations in the domestic downstream sector. Over 70% of shares of Sinopec Limited are 
currently held by Sinopec Group, which is state-controlled through SASAC (State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council). Other major shareholders 
include JP Morgan Chase & Co., Blackrock, and Schroders. 
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Sinopec Group and Sinopec Limited act as separate entities, however a careful analysis of 
the most significant deals of the two companies reveals that their internationalization strategies 
complement each other and can be treated as one. The same can be applied to the other major 
Chinese NOC: CNPC and its traded arm PetroChina, the latter formed in 1999 and granted with 
the bulk of parent company’s assets. 
Sinopec Limited obviously benefits from finance and HR activities of Sinopec Group. 
The companies share top management and enjoy preferential treatment from the state-owned 
China Development Bank, which provides loans for both them and their partners under the so-
called ‘loan-for-oil’ agreements (case 1). Access to cheap capital is a very important resource for 
both companies that helps them increase bargaining power and overcome the challenges that are 
typically faced by late entrants into the energy sector. Finance and HR can be regarded as 
support activities shared by both companies across their value chains and serve as evidence of 
the strategic alliance existing between them.  
Besides this, Sinopec Group, being the main shareholder of Sinopec Limited, provides it 
with political leverage. The state-owned company is directly governed by SASAC and has long-
established and politicized relationship with China Development Bank. Virtually every deal of 
Sinopec Group and Sinopec Limited is saturated with if not driven by the political agenda. In 
fact, mutually beneficial relationship with the government it is a type of support activity that is 
not directly mentioned in Porter’s value chain model, but is evident in case of Chinese NOCs.  
Sinopec Group is very active outside of China and pursues an expansion growth strategy. 
It is present overseas in various forms and focuses on market development (cases 2, 6) and 
diversification (cases 3, 4, 5). The geography of its deals is spread across all continents and is 
concentrated in the Middle East (cases 2, 3), South America (case 4), and Africa (case 6), 
regions with high political risk and often very weak institutions. Sinopec Group’s presence in 
developed markets, such as the USA, is limited by the host countries’ economic and energy 
security considerations.  
The listed Sinopec Limited is mostly active within China and almost exclusively engages 
in low-risk joint ventures with foreign firms to either get access to their technology or secure oil 
imports by establishing joint refineries that require high commitment from all parties (cases 7, 8). 
These kinds of low-risk undertakings in China with its monopolized oil market and huge 
growing demand support financial health and stability of the traded company that must take into 
consideration the interests of all shareholders. From the perspective of growth, Sinopec Limited 
focuses on market penetration (case 7) and product development (case 8). 
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It can be observed that the political agenda is highly important for both Sinopec Group 
and Sinopec Limited. The former acts on behalf of the government and secures oil supply and 
technology transfer in both high-risk (cases 2, 3, 4, 6) and low-risk (case 5) environments. The 
latter ties suppliers to local Chinese market through JVs (case 7), and develops technology that 
will benefit the company financially and the country politically (case 8). The two entities often 
engage in deals with the same foreign firms, but the cooperation is manifested in different forms 
(cases 3, 7). 
It has been noticed, however, that the Chinese NOCs’ internationalization strategy is not 
entirely uniform. PetroChina, the traded arm of CNPC, is active abroad as well as at home. The 
scope of its business overseas can be hardly compared to that of its parent company, however, it 
suggests that the strategy is constantly evolving and should receive sufficient attention from 
practitioners and scholars. Sinopec Limited has recently announced that it may purchase 
overseas upstream assets from Sinopec Group and turn into a major international player itself, 
just as PetroChina. This may bring the internationalization strategies of Chinese NOCs back to 
the entirely uniform state again, but will certainly require additional study. 
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Findings and discussion 
The researched has revealed the following: 
1. Both domestic and international economic policies of the PRC are the ultimate drivers 
for Chinese NOCs’ internationalization activity. As a result, their internationalization 
strategies are not only tied to, but also facilitated and directed by the government.  This 
relationship shapes the strict top-down hierarchical structure of the strategies and leads 
to their having a clear algorithmic nature.  
2. Internationalization activity of Chinese NOCs can be split into support activities 
(shared HR, political facilitation, state financing and so on), which are applied to all 
projects, and primary activities. Primary activities of various business units differ in 
each case and depend on the nature of particular deals. 
3. Support activities mentioned above are the key factors that shape the 
internationalization strategies and lead the NOCs to undertake particular projects at the 
business unit level. The current strategy of Sinopec Group, Sinopec Limited, CNPC, 
and PetroChina (major Chinese NOCs) is the expansion strategy. 
4. The expansion strategy manifests itself differently in different types of deals. To 
describe particular modifications of the strategy, Igor Ansoff’s product-market 
framework can be employed. 
5. To attain the objectives of expansion strategy, the so-called functional project strategies 
are developed and implemented: production strategy, financial strategy, and some other 
strategies, which are not covered in this research. 
 Financial strategy is shaped at the support activities level. 
 Production strategy is shaped differently for every given type of project and 
includes several dimensions: 
 What entity is engaged in the deal, i.e. a 100% state-owned NOC (Sinopec 
Group, CNPC) or its traded arm (Sinopec Limited PetroChina), depending on 
the risk level (the higher the risk the more likely a 100% state-owned entity is 
the actor) 
 What kind of legal form does the activity take (JV with majority/minority of 
shares, WOS) 
Detailed layout of the particular factors that are taken into consideration when the 
production strategy is being formed can be found in Table 1. 
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It becomes evident that the internationalization strategies of Chinese NOCs should be 
studied at two levels: the corporate level that covers support activities, and the project level that 
describes primary activities. This can attributed to their specific structure, i.e. a 100% state-
owned entity passes down the directives it received from the government to its traded arm, after 
which internationalization ‘manuals’ tailored to each particular case are developed. This 
approach can be applied to all state-owned companies functioning within industries considered 
strategic by respective governments. 
China’s policy of energy security in the 1990’ has pushed local NOCs to develop outside 
of China, while vast cash deposits facilitated their progress. Next step was taken in the 2000’, 
when NOCs established their traded arms (Sinopec Limited and PetroChina) to increase 
efficiency and monetize on the domestic market. 
The analysis of cases has revealed that there is a strategic alliance between Chinese state-
owned banks, national oil companies and their traded arms, with distinctive role assigned to each 
member. The alliance in general balances between political and commercial interests, with the 
former mostly pursued by the state-owned Sinopec Group and CNPC, and the latter driving 
Sinopec Limited and PetroChina. 
Despite being different legal entities, all Chinese NOCs are controlled by the government 
through a special body that provides the ultimate agenda. This leads to their having a shared 
strategy that has been revealed in this study. 
Oil industry can be roughly divided into the upstream and downstream sectors. The 
upstream sector covers exploration and extraction of oil as well as the related technology, while 
the downstream sector is centered on refining, marketing and distribution. It can be easily 
deducted that the upstream sector has more strategic significance, because oil can be used 
without a refinery (e.g. sold as crude or refined by small grassroots factories), but refineries 
cannot run without oil supply. Quite unfortunate for the Chinese NOCs, there were late entrants 
in the international energy market and faced the challenge of securing resources. This forced 
them to internationalize into the high-risk areas of the world such as some parts of the Middle 
East or Africa. 
The combination of high strategic significance of the upstream sector and high risk of the 
available options define the first level of the internationalization strategy of Chinese NOCs: 
overseas expansion is almost exclusively conducted by 100% state-owned entities, namely 
Sinopec Group and CNPC. Their traded arms, Sinopec Limited and PetroChina, are mostly 
responsible for the less risky and well-controlled domestic operations. 
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Different motives for internationalization lead to a variety in geographical locations. 
Downstream sector implies resources as the primary motive, and leads to expansion into 
countries that allow large-scale extraction of strategic resources by foreign NOCs. It happens 
that such countries have weak institutions and high political risk (Nigeria, Cameroon, Sudan, 
Iraq, Iran, Russia). There, Chinese NOCs may partner up with local governments or local NOCs 
to establish joint ventures or even invest into a wholly owned subsidiary. The choice depends on 
whether the host state is strong enough to secure the majority of shares in the JV or at least not 
allow the Chinese to create a WOS. 
Technology can also drive expansion into downstream, especially when it has to do with 
challenging oilfields. In this case, geography does not play a significant role, unlike the choice of 
partner. Major IOCs or technologically developed ‘niche’ and service firms possess the desired 
technology, and Chinese NOCs agree to hold minority stakes in JVs with such enterprises (Brazil, 
USA, Canada). 
Apart from the upstream sector, downstream sector has also become increasingly important 
for Chinese NOCs. As a part of the expansion strategy, it allows them to diversify, i.e. refine 
crude oil and sell new products in new markets. The amount of resources and the market size 
define the choice of host country for the downstream internationalization activity (Nigeria, Saudi 
Arabia, Russia). Whenever possible, the NOC tries to establish a WOS or a JV with a majority 
stake, but the particular form depends on whether the local state is strong (Russia) or weak 
(Nigeria). 
Domestic internationalization activity is primarily driven by technology-seeking motives. 
Chinese NOCs represented by their traded arms engage in low-risk joint ventures with 
international oil companies or service firms that can bring in the necessary know-how and 
transfer it to their Chinese counterparts. Another motive is the creation of a seller lock-in 
situation, when a major oil supplier invests into a large refinery in China and signs a long-term 
contract. As a result, the supplier becomes dependent on the Chinese market and takes up 
significant fixed costs. All JVs on China’s soil are controlled by local companies that motivate 
their partners by allowing access to the immense domestic market. 
The summary of the strategic framework is presented in Table 1. 
 
The framework may also help us make assumptions about potential deals in various 
locations, e.g. Russia, a country with significant resources and large population, but high 
political risk and weak institutions. Our strategic framework implies that since the deal is to take 
place overseas, a 100% state-owned company will participate. The potential deal would be 
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driven by resource-seeking or market-seeking motives, but the political and economic 
vulnerability of Russia implies that most probably the resource-seeking motive would take over 
as the more profitable option, given the weak domestic demand and the government’s need for 
investment (see case 2 on Iran). The counterpart would be the Russian government or a local 
NOC, and the deal would be financed by Chinese state-owned banks, Sinopec’s own capital or 
CDB, very likely through a loan-for-oil contract. Sinopec Group would attempt to establish a 
WOS or have the majority stake in the JV, but since Russia does not allow foreign companies to 
operate strategic assets alone, the Chinese party would have to agree to a minority share. 
However, the vulnerability of the Russian counterpart and the political/financial leverage would 
help the Chinese get a significant stake in a JV they would consider important enough.  
A good illustration to the explanatory and predictive power of the resulting framework can 
be observed in the recent deal between Rosneft and Sinopec Group over the Russkoye and 
Yurubcheno-Tokhomskoye oil fields in East Siberia. The Russian company was looking for a 
partner to co-develop the fields in order to decrease the operational risks, and as a result a joint 
venture between Rosneft and Sinopec Group was established, the latter holding a significant 
stake, but not the majority (49%).  
The framework could be further employed by Russian companies to: 
1) Asses and predict Chinese NOCs’ international behavior 
2) Develop attractive investment projects for Chinese NOCs domestically and abroad 
3) Develop more efficient internationalization strategies that would cover both primary 
and support activities and involve co-operation between state-owned banks, NOCs, and 
the government. 
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Appendix1. Table 1 -  Internationalization strategy of Chinese NOCs: the summary 
 
sectors international upstream international downstream domestic upstream domestic downstream 
environment 
high risk areas with 
weak institutions 
not applicable 
areas with large resources & large 
market 
not applicable not applicable 
political risk high low low to high (depends on region) Low low 
partners 
host country 
governement/NOCs 
IOCs 
host country 
governement/NOCs/IOCs 
IOCs/service companies NOCs/IOCs 
motives & 
growth 
strategy 
resource seeking; 
market development 
technology 
seeking; 
diversification 
market seeking;  
diversification 
technology seeking; 
product development 
technology seeking, lock-in; 
market penetration/product 
development 
actors 100% state-owned firm traded arm of 100% state-owned firm 
forms 
JVs with minority 
shares if strong-state 
JVs with minority 
shares 
JVs with minority shares if 
strong-state 
JVs with majority shares JVs with majority shares 
JVs with majority or 
WOS if institutions  
weak 
JVs with majority shares or WOS 
if institutions weak 
financing 
state-owned banks, 
loan-for-oil, own 
capital 
state-owned 
banks, own 
capital 
state-owned banks, own capital 
state-owned banks, private banks, 
own capital 
state-owned banks, private banks, 
own capital 
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Appendix 2. Table 2 - Sinopec Group and Sinopec Limited Internationalizion Activity: Summary of Cases 
Sinopec Group and Sinopec Limited Internationalizion Activity: Summary of Cases 
# (A) Parties 
(B) 
Date 
(C) 
Location 
(D) Goal of 
activity 
(E) Key 
activities 
(F) 
Ownership 
structure 
(G) 
Duration 
(H) Benefits 
(I) Risks 
(Sinopec) 
(J) Motives 
and Growth 
Options 
(Sinopec) 
(K) Factors 
(Sinopec) 
Stategic Alliance 
1 
P1 
China Development 
Bank     (state-owned) 
1990' Worldwide 
Fulfilling 
political 
objectives of 
energy security 
and economic 
development 
Joint 
participation in 
loan-for-oil and 
loan-for-gas 
deals 
worldwide 
Strategic 
Alliance 
Still 
exists 
Access to market 
(partners of NOCs; 
fullfilling political 
agenda) 
Price volatility 
Strategic 
asset-seeking 
CDB provides a 
springboard for 
Chinese NOCs 
and helps to tie 
suppliers 
P2 
Sinopec Group (state-
owned); Sinopec 
Limited                     
(partially traded) 
Reducing risks, 
increasing political 
leverage, access to 
cheap capital 
Problems with 
government in 
strong institution 
environment 
Joint Ventures 
2 
P1 
National Iranian Oil 
Company (state-
owned) 
2007 Iran 
Jointly develop 
giant 
hydrocarbons 
reserves in 
Yadavaran Field 
in Iran 
Exploration, 
drilling, 
extraction, 
production, 
distribution 
Joint 
Venture                     
(Sinopec 
51%) 
Still 
exists 
Investment, 
infrastructure, tying 
customer Political 
instability, 
international 
sanctions 
Resource-
seeking, 
Market 
Development 
(Ansoff) 
Low competition, 
military 
cooperation, 
Iran's 
vulnerability P2 
Sinopec Group (state-
owned) 
Access to one of the 
largest oilfields in 
the Midle East, 
cheap oil, control 
over the JV 
3 
P1 
Exxon Mobil                                  
(IOC) 
2007 China 
Development 
and operation of 
a integrated 
refinery and a 
chain of filling 
stations 
Construction, 
Financing 
Marketing, 
Operations 
Joint 
Venture             
(Sinopec 
50%,                  
Exxon 
Mobil 25%,           
Saudi 
Aramco 
25%) 
Still 
exists 
Access to market 
Overreliance on 
one major 
suppllier 
Resource-
seeking, 
Technology-
seeking, 
Product 
development 
(Ansoff) 
Access to and 
knowledge of the 
large Chinee 
market, stong 
state in China 
P2 
Saudi Arabian Oil    
(SaudiAramco)                             
(state-owned) 
Access to market, 
tying a customer to 
supplies (some 
facilities can only 
use Arabian oil) 
P3 
Sinopec Limited                           
(partially traded) 
Stable supply and 
financing from Saudi 
Aramco, marketing 
knowledge from 
ExxonMobil 
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4 
P1 
Saudi Arabian Oil    
(SaudiAramco)                             
(state-owned) 
2010 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Development 
and operation of 
a refinery in 
Saudi Arabia 
Development, 
operations 
Joint 
Venture              
(Sinopec  
37.5%,             
Saudi 
Aramco 
62,5%) 
Still 
exists 
Additional 
financing, tying a 
custmer Iran factor, no 
control over the 
JV 
Market-
seeking, 
Diversification 
(Ansoff) 
Importnace of 
Saudi Arabia's oil 
supply, strong 
state P2 
Sinopec Group (state-
owned) 
Access to market, 
tying a supplier 
5 
P1 
Repsol                                                 
(IOC) 
2010 Brazil 
Jointly develop 
hydrocarbons in 
Santos basin in 
Brazil  
Exploration, 
drilling, 
extraction, 
production, 
distribution 
Joint 
Venture                 
(Sinopec 
40%) 
Still 
exists 
Additional 
financing, political 
leverage, potential 
access to Chinese 
market 
Political 
instability, no 
control over the 
JV 
Resource-
seeking, 
technology-
seeking, 
Diversification 
(Ansoff) 
Lack of 
technology and 
expertise in South 
Amercia 
P2 
Sinopec Group (state-
owned) 
Technology transfer, 
stable supply, access 
to South American 
market 
6 
P1 
Devon Energy                               
(IOC) 
2012 USA 
Scaling up shale 
oil and gas 
production of 
Devon Energy 
Joint 
Production 
Joint 
Venture              
(Sinopec 
33% in 5 
shale sites) 
Still 
exists 
Additional financing 
Price volatility, 
US institutions 
and regulations 
Technology-
seeking, 
Diversification 
(Ansoff) 
Strong 
institutions, 
cutting edge 
technology P2 
Sinopec Group (state-
owned) 
Technology transfer, 
access to market 
7 
P1 
Royal Dutch Shell                               
(IOC) 
2012 China 
Exploration and 
production of 
shale oil and gas 
in China 
Joint R&D 
(Exploration 
and drilling of 
exploration 
wells; joint 
production and 
subsequent 
product sharing 
if results 
satisfactory) 
Prodcut 
sharing                      
(Shell 
repayed by 
product, 
Sinopec - 
the only 
operator) 
Still 
exists 
Access to China's 
shale gas reserves, 
access to market 
Price volatility 
Technology-
seeking, 
Product 
development 
(Ansoff) 
Access to and 
knowledge of the 
large Chinee 
market, stong 
state in China P2 
Sinopec Limited                       
(partially traded) 
Technology transfer, 
low risk contract 
Acquisitions 
8 
P1 
Addax Petroleum                             
(IOC) 
2009 
Africa, 
Middle 
East 
Get access to 
reserves in 
Africa and the 
Middle East 
Oil extraction 
100% 
acquisition 
Still 
exists 
Acess to reserves 
and markets in 
Africa and the 
Middle East 
No prior 
experience of 
operations of such 
scale in the 
politically 
turbulent region 
Resource-
seeking 
Springboard 
perspective, weak 
institutions in the 
countries of 
operation, 
relatively low 
price of the 
acquisition 
following the 
financial crisis 
P2 
Sinopec Group (state-
owned) 
 
